US Civil Military Imbalance - Africa, from Refugees International

A POWERFUL
VOICE FOR
LIFESAVING
ACTION
Mark Malan
LESSONS
FROM THE
OPERATIONAL
LEVEL IN
AFRICA
U.S. CIVIL-MILITAR Y IMBALAN CE
FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT
July 2008
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA
Acknowledgements
The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of the many people interviewed in
Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo during Refugees International’s visits to both
countries. Staff members of the United Nations and many local and international non-governmental
organizations were particularly helpful, and their willingness to share information and
insights is sincerely appreciated. Superintendent Dag Roger Dahlen of the Norwegian Police
and Lieutenant Colonel William M. Wyatt of the U.S. Army deserve a special thank you for
their time, interest, and candid exchange of information on police and military reform in Liberia.
The author would also like to thank Refugees International colleagues Megan Fowler and
Kimberly Compton, whose input and help with the preparation of this report were invaluable.
And finally, the author thanks the Connect U.S. Fund for their generous financial support that
made this report possible.
About Refugees International
Refugees International advocates for lifesaving assistance and protection for displaced people
and promotes solutions to displacement crises. Based on our on-the-ground knowledge of key
humanitarian emergencies, Refugees International successfully pressures governments, international
agencies and nongovernmental organizations to improve conditions for displaced people.
Refugees International is an independent, non-profit humanitarian advocacy organization
based in Washington, DC. We do not accept government or United Nations funding, relying
instead on contributions from individuals, foundations and corporations. Learn more at
www.refugeesinternational.org.
New recruits for the Armed
Forced of Liberia undergo
training exercises in
Monrovia as part of
a U.S.-funded security
sector reform plan. The
U.S. is only helping four
African countries
transform their armies
and security agencies.
©Refugees International
www.refugesinternational .org
Ta ble of Contents
Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Nature of the Imbalance . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Cold War Peace Dividend: Forever Lost To GWOT?. . . 3
The Perversion of Aid. . . . . . . . . . . 4
Militarization and “Securitization” of U.S. Foreign Assistance. . . 7
Overhauling Foreign Assistance. . . . . 10
The Marginalization of Africa in U.S. Foreign Policy. . . 12
U.S. Security Sector Reform Efforts In Liberia. . . . 16
Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
The Legal Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
The Conceptual Framework. . . . . . . . . . . 18
Role of the New AFL and the Security Sector Reform Program . . 19
Recruitment and Training. . . . . . . 21
The New AFL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Funding and Resources . . . . . . . . . . 23
Transparency and Accountability. . . . 24
Contractors Are Not the Answer. . . . . . . . 24
Security Sector Reform Efforts in the DR Congo . . . 26
Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Military “Integration” in the DRC. . . 26
The European Contribution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Real Commitment Needed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Background. . . . . . . . . . 31
Posture and Promises. . . 32
Extant U.S. Security Programs in Africa. . . . 33
Resource Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Potential for a Cohesive Approach to Africa. . . . . 37
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Recommendations. . . . . . . 40
List of Acronyms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA
executive summar y
In his introduction to the 2002 National Security Strategy, President Bush said: “America is
now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.” Failing states with weak
state institutions struggle to deliver services to their population or to control corruption and
are at risk of ongoing conflict. When these countries descend into civil war, massive flows of
refugees and large-scale human displacement lead to further regional and global instability.
Nowhere is this more of a challenge than in Africa.
There is broad agreement that combating today’s global threats requires a balanced, integrated
approach with coordinated defense, diplomacy and development efforts. In practice,
the Pentagon is largely dictating America’s approach to foreign policy. The nation’s foreign aid
budget is too low; its civilian capacity to construct and carry out effective, long-term policies to
rebuild states is too weak; interventions abroad are often unilateral when multilateral solutions
could be more effective; and the military, which is well trained to invade countries, not to build
them up, is playing an increasingly active and well-funded role in promoting development and
democracy. Even Defense Secretary Robert Gates noted that U.S. soldiers conducting development
and assistance activities in countries where they frequently don’t speak the language is
“no replacement for the real thing – civilian involvement and expertise.”
The rising military role in shaping U.S. global engagement is a challenge to the next
president. Foreign assistance represents less than one percent of the federal budget, while
defense spending is 20%. The U.S. military has over 1.5 million uniformed active duty employees
and over 10,100 civilian employees, while the Department of State has some 6,500 permanent
employees. Although several high-level task forces and commissions have emphasized
the urgent need to modernize our aid infrastructure and increase sustainable development
activities, such assistance is increasingly being overseen by military institutions whose policies
are driven by the Global War on Terror, not by the war against poverty. Between 1998 and
2005, the percentage of Official Development Assistance the Pentagon controlled exploded
from 3.5% to nearly 22%, while the percentage controlled by the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) shrunk from 65% to 40%.
This civil-military imbalance has particular ramifications for Africa, where Global War on Terror
imperatives do not address the continent’s biggest needs for security assistance. The U.S.
is only helping four African countries transform their armies and security agencies into professional
organizations that protect citizens rather than abuse them. Resources are allocated
in a manner that does not reflect the continent’s most pressing priorities. For example, the
U.S. has allocated $49.65 million for reforming a 2,000-strong Liberian army to defend the
four million people of that country. In contrast, it only plans to spend $5.5 million in 2009 to
help reform a 164,000-strong army in the DR Congo, a country with 65 million people where
Africa’s “first world war” claimed the lives of over five million people.
Two case studies emphasize the problems inherent in the U.S. approach. Military dominance
over reform programs in Liberia has resulted in a policy focused solely on restructuring Liberia’s
army by expensive private contractors, DynCorp and Pacific Architects and Engineers.
Meanwhile, intelligence, judiciary, and prison agencies are sadly neglected. In the DR Congo,
the State Department has played a very active role in facilitating dialogue among belligerents
and is concerned about the humanitarian situation in the east, but the Defense Department is
virtually ignoring the nation’s desperate need of military reform. As a result, an inadequately
resourced security sector reform program has contributed to the Congolese army becoming a
major source of insecurity for civilian communities.
www.refugesinternational .org
The U.S. military’s new Africa Command (AFRICOM) is poised to become the dominant
influence over U.S. policy on the continent. Originally, AFRICOM was promoted as integrating
military and civilian agencies for “humanitarian assistance, civic action… and response to
natural disasters.” After much criticism from African nations and the international humanitarian
community, the new AFRICOM Commander is now emphasizing the value the Command
can add to the many U.S. military programs already operating in Africa.
AFRICOM should focus on two unashamedly military/political roles that will strengthen
peace and security in Africa: a) assisting African countries with defense sector reform; and b)
supporting Africa’s regional organizations in building conflict management and standby force
capacity. The Command’s legitimacy will ultimately be determined by its ability to work with
the African Union and UN operations to address Africa’s principal security challenge – mobilizing
sufficient resources to provide a secure, stable and well-governed environment in which
human rights are protected and promoted and where business can thrive. Assisting with the
coordination of security sector and peacekeeping assistance should be strongly emphasized
in its mandate to help national governments absorb the plethora of uncoordinated initiatives
from various coalitions of donor countries.
Another priority for AFRICOM should be to enhance peacekeeping capacity-building programs.
As a matter of urgency, AFRICOM should establish a core of civil-military expertise specifically
related to UN peace operations in Africa. With the demand for African peacekeepers far outstripping
the supply of adequately trained and equipped forces, AFRICOM has the potential to
increase the number of trained soldiers for UN or AU peace operations.
AFRICOM could also enhance international cooperation for delivering more sustainable
support to African efforts to establish peace and security. Instead of having three commanders
that deal with Africa as a third or fourth priority, an informed, consistent and coherent
engagement with Africa could be established. However, AFRICOM’s current meager budget
for bilateral security cooperation falls far short of what is needed to have true credibility and
impact. Currently, no funds are allocated for security sector and governance capacity-building
for African nations. Instead, funding is being requested for Global War on Terror priorities.
While AFRICOM can improve engagement with African nations, more effective non-military
support is needed to provide the basic foundations of stability that would encourage refugees
to return home and would meet Africa’s enormous development challenges. Although the current
administration is promoting a range of initiatives to redress the imbalance in U.S. instruments
for global engagement, these are aimed at a “quick fix” for long-broken machinery.
The next president must strengthen civilian professional capacity to carry out diplomatic and
development operations. More funding is needed to address the current 17 to 1 spending
imbalance in staffing and resources between defense and diplomatic/development operations,
and to reduce the use of contractors in foreign assistance programs. A thorough assessment of
both civilian and military capacities to achieve developmental goals must also be conducted.
Doing a few things well in Africa, and doing the right thing in Africa, can have a positive
impact on 53 UN member states, help uplift 80% of the world’s poorest people, and win
friends and influence in the most under-governed continent in the world. If the establishment
of AFRICOM, the strengthening of the State Department’s Africa Bureau and USAID
programs in Africa can be seen to produce positive results, the effort could serve as a model
for U.S. global engagement.
ii
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL 1 LEVEL IN AFRICA
Introduction
The impetus for recent efforts by the U.S.
and other donor governments to integrate
their defense, diplomatic, development, and
other policies in engaging weak, failing, and
war-torn countries in the developing world
is clear: fragile states are not only a major
development challenge; they are also seen
as a leading source of transnational threats
to global security.1 From a humanitarian
perspective, one of the major concerns about
fragile states is the massive flows of refugees
and the large-scale human displacement that
results when these countries descend into
civil war.
Policy makers have come to recognize that
the security, governance, and development
challenges of fragile and failing states are
interconnected. Experience suggests that efforts
to bolster, reform, or reconstruct weak
or failed states must simultaneously address
security and stability, good governance, and
development needs. To do so effectively
requires a wide range of capabilities and
instruments spanning traditionally independent
spheres of diplomacy, development, and
defense (the 3Ds) – as well as trade, finance,
intelligence, and others. Moreover, these elements
of engagement should be consciously
aligned so as to be mutually reinforcing.2
In the U.S., the quest for policy coherence is
much more difficult than in countries such as
Canada, the UK and Sweden because in these
and other donor countries, the amount of
government resources allocated for development
and diplomacy is fairly well balanced
with money for defense. In the U.S., however,
defense spending dwarfs that of the civilian
agencies for global engagement by a factor
of approximately seventeen to one. Foreign
assistance represents less than one percent
of the federal budget, while defense spending
is 20%.3 The U.S. military (including the
Coast Guard) has over 1.5 million uniformed
active duty employees, nearly a million more
in the reserve forces, and over 10,100 civilian
employees.4 By contrast, the Department of
State has some 6,500 permanent employees
U.S. CIVIL-MILITAR Y IMBALAN CE FOR
GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT:
lesons from the operational level in africa
Nearly one million people
are displaced inside Somalia,
including 250,000 in this
camp. Fragile states like
Somalia are not only a major
development challenge;
they are a major threat to
regional and global stability.
©Refugees International
www.refugesinternational .org
While Africa has
historically been of
marginal strategic
interest to America,
the majority of the
world’s most fragile
states are on that
continent.
– about the same as the number of personnel
serving in one U.S. carrier battle group, and
less than the number employed in military
bands. The U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) has only 2,021 permanent
employees – a number said to be less
than the number of lawyers working in DOD
headquarters at the Pentagon.
Giant arms manufacturers such as Lockheed
Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman
have been the main beneficiaries of the Pentagon’s
rising expenditures.5 The Pentagon’s
fast-growing service contractors have equally
been making fortunes. Contracted services
extend from basic food and sanitation provision
to highly sophisticated services, such as
the provision of security to U.S. personnel
serving abroad. By the end of 2006, there
were about 100,000 government contractors
operating in Iraq, not counting subcontractors
– a total that was fast approaching the size of
the U.S. military force there.6
The inflated defense budget deprives civilian
agencies of the resources they need to build up
their own technical expertise and response capabilities,
respond to unforeseen contingencies
and provide foreign aid to fragile and post-conflict
states. While exaggerating the position of
the Pentagon in the nation’s national security
structure, the greatly skewed resource allocations
have led to an over-reliance on soldiers
to conduct post-conflict activities – such as
policing, governance reform and infrastructure
development – that should logically be done by
civilian agencies and actors. 7
Although there is broad rhetorical agreement
that the problems of poor governance, instability,
and war-torn states require integrated,
“3D” approaches (through merging or at least
better coordinating defense, diplomacy, and
development efforts), the Pentagon is largely
dictating the doctrinal debate on how to
stabilize and reconstruct failed states. There
is not yet a strong political or interagency consensus
on the rationale for U.S. engagement;
the criteria that should guide U.S. involvement;
the scale of U.S. aspirations; the end
state toward which prevention, stabilization
and reconstruction efforts should be directed;
and the means required to achieve success.8
Achieving consensus will require strong
leadership from the relevant civilian agencies
of government, as well as strong guidance and
support from the presidency and the legislature.
While Africa has historically been of marginal
strategic interest to America, the majority
of the world’s most fragile states are on that
continent. However, the new U.S. concern
for failed states is shaped by recent experience
in Afghanistan and Iraq, and resources
allocated accordingly. Even where the State
Department has a clear mandate and budget
to engage in stabilization and reconstruction
tasks in Africa (such as security sector
reform in Liberia, and support to the African
Union and the AU Mission in Sudan), core
tasks are contracted out to private U.S.
companies. The issues of State Department
weakness and of military dominance of U.S.
Africa policy come to the fore in the debate
on the establishment of AFRICOM.
civilia n vs. militar y personnel
Department Number of Personnel
US Military
Active Duty Employees 1,500,000
US Military
Reserve Forces 1,000,000
US Military
Civilian Employees 10,100
US Dept of State
Permanent Employees 6,500
USAID
Permanent Employees 2,021
On March 13, 2008 General ‘Kip’ Ward,
Commander of AFRICOM, presented before
the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees the first free-standing posture
statement on the U.S. security strategy for
Africa. According to Ward:
“AFRICOM is pioneering a new way for a
Unified Command to fulfill its role in supporting
the security interests of our nation.
From inception, AFRICOM was intended
to be a different kind of command designed
to address the changing security challenges
confronting the U.S. in the 21st century.
We are integrating interagency personnel
into our structure to improve both the
planning and execution of our duties. By
incorporating interagency representatives
into our structure, we will provide better
informed and more effective support to
initiatives led by civilian Departments and
Agencies, such as the Department of State
(DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID).” 9
Many humanitarian NGOs are highly critical
of the new Command and are deeply concerned
by the role of AFRICOM in harnessing
– or hijacking – relief and development
assistance to combat terrorism. This role is
described by Robert Kaplan as one in which:
“…through a combination of small-scale
military strikes that do not generate bad
publicity and constant involvement on the
soft, humanitarian side of military operations,
AFRICOM could rebuild the post-Iraq
image of the American soldier in the global
commons… AFRICOM will be about picking
low-hanging terrorist fruit. The so-called
long war – and particularly the work of AFRICOM
– will be relentless and low-key.”10
THE NATU RE OF THE IMB ALANCE
The Cold War Peace Dividend:
Forever Lost to GWOT?
The Cold War years saw high spending on
aid as well as defense, as each super power
and their allies aided regimes friendly to
their strategic interests. The end of the Cold
War did not, however, see reduced military
budgets resulting in some resources being
put towards increased aid, as hoped.
While there was a peace dividend in the
U.S., it was erased after September 11, 2001.
U.S. military spending returned to Cold
War levels by 2004 and in 2006, spending
was 9 per cent higher in real terms
than in 1988.11 Between 2001 and 2007,
U.S. military expenditure increased by
53% in real terms. Since 2001, Congress
has provided the Department of Defense
(DOD) with hundreds of billions of dollars
in supplemental and annual appropriations
for military operations in support of the
war on terrorism. DOD’s reported annual
obligations for GWOT have shown a steady
increase from about $0.2 billion in fiscal
year 2001 to about $139.8 billion in fiscal
year 2007. To continue GWOT operations,
the President requested $189.3 billion in
appropriations for DOD in fiscal year 2008.
The United States’ commitments to GWOT
will likely involve the continued investment
of significant resources, requiring decision
makers to consider difficult trade-offs as the
nation faces an increasing long-range fiscal
challenge.
The supplemental appropriation to pay for
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would
bring proposed military spending for FY
2008 to $647.2 billion, the highest level of
military spending since the end of World
War II.12 Using official budget figures,
William D. Hartung, provides the following
useful comparisons:
• Proposed U.S. military spending for FY
2008 is larger than military spending
by all of the other nations in the world
combined.
• The FY 2008 military budget is more
than 30 times higher than all spending
on State Department operations and
non-military foreign aid combined.
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA
The FY 2008
military budget
is more than 30
times higher than
all spending on
State Department
operations and nonmilitary
foreign aid
combined.
• The FY 2008 military spending
represents 58 cents out of every dollar
spent by the U.S. government on discretionary
programs: education, health,
housing assistance, international affairs,
natural resources and environment, justice,
veterans' benefits, science and space,
transportation, training/employment and
social services, economic development,
and several more items. 13
By any conceivable measure, the United
States is currently the most powerful country
in the history of the world. Potential challengers
cannot even begin to rival its military
power. The United States outspends China
by about seven to one. China spends 3.9 percent
of its GDP on defense; it would have to
spend about 25 percent of GDP on defense if
it were to begin to rival the United States.
The Perversion of Aid
A smart security strategy must be comprehensive
and long-term to combat today’s
global threats. However, despite its
extraordinary and historically unprecedented
military preeminence, the United States has
failed to reduce, to any significant degree,
the endemic insecurity that prevails among
the people of the world’s poorest nations
– including those living in the kind of ‘failing
states’ that are seen as likely ‘breeding
grounds’ for terrorists. Approximately twofifths
of the world population live in ‘highmortality
developing countries’ – mainly
located in sub-Saharan Africa and South-East
Asia. In these countries, one-third of premature
death and disability results from four
risk factors: being underweight; unsafe sex;
unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene; and
indoor smoke from fossil fuel.
www.refugesinternational .org
The United States
has failed to reduce…
the endemic
insecurity that
prevails among the
people of the world’s
poorest nations.
Quality-adjusted ai d and chari table giving/GDP (%)
Country Quality-adjusted aid as percent of GDP
Sweden 0.5
Denmark 0.48
Netherlands 0.45
Norway 0.4
France 0.23
Belgium 0.21
Switzerland 0.21
Finland 0.19
United Kingdom 0.19
Austria 0.15
Germany 0.15
Canada 0.14
Ireland 0.12
Australia 0.11
Italy 0.11
Portugal 0.1
Japan 0.09
Greece 0.07
Spain 0.07
United States 0.07
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA
Thus, interventions to reduce hunger, improve
the physical environment and reduce poverty
are important means of improving the security
of human lives. Furthermore, in comparisons
with military expenditure, the prevention
strategies developed for the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the United Nations
to achieve this appear highly cost-effective. For
example, it has been estimated that 8 million
lives could be saved annually for an investment
of $57 billion in basic health interventions in
poor countries.
U.S. aid, in terms of percentage of GDP,
has almost always been lower than any other
industrialized nation in the world, though
since 2000, its dollar amount has been the
highest. Moreover, if aid numbers are adjusted
to include qualitative indicators of the
efficacy of aid, as David Roodman has done,
then the U.S. ranks no higher than Greece
and Spain.14
In 1970, official development assistance was
understood as bilateral grants and loans on
concessional terms, and official contributions
to multilateral agencies. However, a number
of factors have led to a large decline in aid
that meets such criteria – including tighter
budgetary constraints in richer countries during
the 1980s; neo-liberalism and structural
adjustment programs; and donors putting a
broader interpretation on what constitutes
development assistance. Regarding the latter,
expanded categories for official development
assistance include, for example:
• Debt relief;
• Subsidies on exports to developing countries;
• Food aid which disposes of agricultural
surpluses resulting from government
subsidies;
• Provision of surplus commodities of little
economic value;
• Administrative costs;
• Payments for care and education of refugees
in donor countries;
• Grants to NGOs and to domestic agencies
to support emergency relief operations; and
• Technical co-operation grants which pay
for the services of nationals of the donor
countries.
In short, many forms of aid are not directed
towards poverty alleviation. For example, in
2006 Action Aid estimated “… that $37 billion
– roughly half of global aid – is ‘phantom
aid,’ that is, it is not genuinely available
to poor countries to fight poverty.” 15 Technical
assistance was singled out as a particular
problem, with at least one quarter of donor
budgets being spent on consultants, research
and training:
“This is despite a growing body of evidence…
that technical assistance is often
overpriced and ineffective, and in the
worst cases destroys rather than builds the
capacity of the poorest countries…Donor
funded advisers have even been brought
in to draft supposedly ‘country owned’
poverty reduction strategies.”16
The U.S. spends more on international
technical assistance than any other donor
– almost half its official development assistance.
The bulk of that funding goes to U.S.
consultants whose real expertise is often
knowing how to adhere to complex U.S.
procurement and administrative procedures
rather than having knowledge of context,
experience in the field, language skills, or a
long-term poverty reduction orientation.17
Between 1998 and 2006, reductions in
USAID direct-hire staff were accompanied
by a sharp increase in foreign assistance
spending, with the result that aid disbursement
per staff member grew by 46 percent
to $2 million. USAID has consequently had
to reduce development expertise in favor of
general management skills.
In fact, the U.S. has no coherent long-term
foreign assistance strategy. As stated by the
Secretary of Defense,
Many forms of
aid are not
directed towards
poverty alleviation.
www.refugesinternational .org
“The U.S. government has tried to meet
post-Cold War challenges and pursue 21st
century objectives with processes and organizations
designed in the wake of the Second
World War.… The last major legislation
structuring how America dispenses foreign
assistance was signed by President Kennedy.
Operating within this outdated bureaucratic
superstructure, the U.S. government has
sought to improve interagency planning and
cooperation through a variety of means: new
legislation, directives, offices, coordinators,
‘tsars’, authorities, and initiatives with varying
degrees of success.”18
Instead of modernizing the Cold War era aid
infrastructure, the U.S. administration has
responded to each new global challenge by
creating new ad hoc institutional arrangements
alongside the old ones – like the
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR), the President’s Malaria Initiative
(PMI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC), and the State/F Bureau.19 America’s
foreign aid is now (mis)managed by an
alphabet soup of no less than fifty separate
units within the executive branch, pursuing
fifty disparate and sometimes overlapping
objectives ranging from narcotics eradication
to biodiversity preservation. Poor coordination
and lack of integration means that
U.S. agencies often work at cross purposes
– something which is not lost on recipient
countries that are already wary of the fact
that the U.S. ties more aid to the purchase
of American goods and services than any
other donor. Of the more than $2.6 billion
in aid that the U.S. reported to the OECD
Development Assistance Committee for
2005, less than $200 million was untied
aid. If development aid is an important element
of the U.S. national security strategy,
including “winning hearts and minds,” then
this sends precisely the wrong message.
Effective aid requires the promotion of ownership
by recipient governments, alignment
of aid under national plans, harmonization
with other donors, and empowerment of the
citizenry. Since 2001, the United States has
pursued a distinctively unilateral posture in
the pursuit of national security and foreign
and development policy. American policy
places little emphasis on the need to harmonize
U.S. approaches with those of other
donors, or indeed to align these policies
with the priorities of aid recipients.
The principle of local ownership is undermined
by the U.S. appropriations process,
which rewards agencies for delivering narrowly
defined outcomes on a year-to-year
basis and provides little space for handing
over controls to foreign states or their
citizens. With the notable exception of the
Millennium Challenge Corporation, U.S.
development agencies are prohibited from
committing funding over the long term,
making it difficult for operational agencies
and recipient governments to plan.20
Similarly, no major donor country makes
less use than the U.S. does of recipient governments’
procurement or public finance
management systems for its funding.21 And
the U.S. ties more aid than any other donor.
Several high level task forces and commissions
have reported on different aspects of U.S. aid
effectiveness in recent years.22 All emphasized
the urgent need to modernize an aid infrastructure
and for greater U.S. engagement on
development. All called for elevating development
on a par with diplomacy and defense –
and not for subordinating it to either. The
United Kingdom provides an example of how
this can be done. Besides being a full cabinet
department, the UK Department for International
Development (DFID) is governed by
the International Development Act, which
mandates that its funds be spent “to support
sustainable development.” This gives the
Secretary of State for development near total
discretion over the use of those funds. DFID’s
Public Service Agreement with the Treasury
provides an additional constraint on the
diversion of DFID resources, by mandating
that 90 percent of the department’s budget be
spent on low-income countries – effectively
restricting the lion’s share of DFID’s aid to the
poorest regions of Africa and Asia. 23
“The U.S. government
has tried to meet
post-Cold War
challenges and
pursue 21st century
objectives with processes
and organizations
designed in the
wake of the Second
World War…”
– Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA
Militarization and “Securitization”
of U.S. Foreign Assistance
The Pentagon has greatly increased and expanded
its involvement into the realm of aid
activities that have traditionally been implemented
by civilian agencies and overseen by
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
The numbers speak for themselves: the
percentage of the Official Development Assistance
the Pentagon controls has exploded
from 1998 to 2005, growing from 3.5% to
nearly 22%, while USAID’s percentage of
ODA shrunk from 65% to 40%.
In 2005, President Bush established a new
National Security Presidential Directive
(NSPD-44)24 and assigned to the Secretary of
State responsibility to prepare for, plan,
coordinate, and implement reconstruction
and stabilization operations in a wide range
of contingencies, ranging from complex
emergencies to failing and failed states, and
war-torn societies. The office is, theoretically,
supposed to serve as the focal point for
creating, managing, and deploying standing
civilian response capabilities for a range of
purposes, including to advance “internal
security, governance and participation, social
and economic well-being, and justice and
reconciliation.”25 Where the U.S. military
may be involved, the office is to coordinate
with the Department of Defense to harmonize
military and civilian involvement.
The directive seems logical enough in concept,
but application has proved extremely
problematic – mainly because the civilian
capacity of the Federal government to implement
international policies and programs has
eroded over the past twenty-five years. The
Department of State is unable to provide even
advisory support to essential governmental
functions in post-conflict states, while USAID
relies largely upon contractors to promote its
various development objectives. Innate civilian
agency capacity, there and elsewhere, to
operate overseas is very, very thin.
In a November 26, 2007 speech, Secretary
Gates explained that DOD has, by force of
circumstance, stepped into the breach:
“The Department of Defense has taken
on many of (the) burdens that might have
been assumed by civilian agencies in the
past.… [F]orced by circumstances, our
brave men and women in uniform have
stepped up to the task, with field artillerymen
and tankers building schools and
mentoring city councils – usually in a
language they don’t speak. … But it is no
replacement for the real thing – civilian
involvement and expertise.”
Secretary Gates lamented the gutting of “key
instruments of America’s national power”
and the withering of America’s ability to
engage, assist, and communicate with other
parts of the world which had been so important
throughout the Cold War.26 Budgetary
allocations are important, but money alone
will not fix the problem without a substantive
overhaul of strategy and policy – while
funding can be relatively quickly allocated, it
will take years to address the civilian deficit
in human resources.
The U.S. response to these problems for the
foreseeable future, it seems, is to formalize
the U.S. military’s present and future roles
in post-conflict reconstruction and statebuilding
processes abroad. DOD Directive
3000.05 Military Support for Stability,
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
(SSTR) Operations, dated November 28,
2005, recognizes that civilian Federal agencies
lack capability to operate in high-risk
environments, and establishes the policy that
DOD shall give stability operations “priority
comparable to combat operations,” and
PENT AGON CONT ROL OF
OF ICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASS IST ANCE
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
1998 2005
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
There is thus a clear 1998 2005
danger that the
U.S. Department
of Defense will
effectively bypass
the United Nations
and other multilateral
institutions at a
time when global
partnerships are
most needed.
www.refugesinternational .org
that U.S. military forces shall be prepared to
establish or maintain order when civilians
cannot do so. The major mission elements
comprising SSTR are to:
“Establish and maintain a safe, secure
environment; deliver humanitarian
assistance; reconstruct critical infrastructure
and restore essential services; support economic
development; establish representative,
effective governance and the rule of law;
and conduct strategic communications.” 27
According to the Secretary of Defense:
“The objective is to synchronize DOD
activities with those of other U.S. Government
agencies and international partners
in coherent campaigns that improve civil
security, promote effective governance,
and foster economic stability. To achieve
our national objectives, stability operations
require unity of purpose and synchronized,
timely efforts in all diplomatic,
defense, and development activities to
build partner capacity and address the
causes of conflict.”28
There is thus a clear danger that the DOD
will effectively bypass the United Nations
and other multilateral institutions at a time
when global partnerships are most needed.
The desire of the Department of Defense for a
“unity of purpose” that uses all U.S. government
agencies as “force multipliers” in the
war on terror is further changing how civilian
agencies operate. This trend is seen in the
current USAID strategic plan, which focuses
on “counterterrorism; weapons of mass
destruction and destabilizing conventional
weapons; security cooperation and security
sector reform; conflict prevention, mitigation,
and response; and transnational crime.”
The results of this strategy have been
dubious. For example, the ‘development’
programs funded under the rubric of the
Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership
(TSCTP) have thus far been little more than
a collection of initiatives cobbled together
from various accounts, with little consideration
of their strategic integration, sustainability,
and long-term developmental impacts.
29 There are also increasing concerns
that USAID intends to seek DOD funding
U.S. soldiers carry school
equipment in eastern Mali
in November 2006. Skewed
resource allocations have led
to an over-reliance on soldiers
to conduct post-conflict
activities – such as policing,
governance reform and development
assistance – that
should logically be done by
civilian agencies..
©REUTERS/Luc Gnago
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA
for USAID development activities – and this
may indeed already have occurred.30
Further, the Pentagon is seeking yet more
discretionary money for military assistance.
Title 10 of the U.S. Code provides funding
for DOD to fight and win America’s wars,
and cannot be used to provide equipment,
supplies, and/or training to build the capacity
of foreign national military forces. However,
Section 1206 of the 2006 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) created a unique
three-year authority permitting DOD and
State jointly to plan, execute, and oversee
up to $300 million annually in bilateral and
regional military-to-military programs
to develop foreign military forces’ capacity
to conduct counterterrorism operations or
to support stability operations. Embassy country
teams and regional combatant commands
jointly formulate projects. As a ‘dual-key’
program, the Secretaries of State and Defense
must both approve the proposed projects.31
The DOD (with strong support from the
Secretary of State) is now requesting Congress
to authorize the “Building Global Partnerships
Act of 2007,” which would make
permanent in Title 10 the three-year pilot
program established under Section 1206
– and would allow the DOD to spend up to
$750 million a year on training and weapons
for militaries of its choosing. The proposed
legislation would allow the Defense Department
to bypass historic provisions within
the Foreign Assistance Act32 that prevent assistance
from going to countries that commit
gross human rights violations, experience a
military coup, engage in nuclear proliferation,
or condone human trafficking, child
soldiers, or religious intolerance. Secretary
Gates also wants to use Section 1206 money
to support non-military forces, such as constabulary,
coast guard, border guards, and
similar units. 33
In advocating for authority and money for
the DOD to support non-military security
agencies, while also arguing against the
funding and execution of Section 1206
activities by the State Department, Secretary
Gates lent credence to fears of increased
militarization of U.S. foreign assistance.
While he emphasized that there has been excellent
cooperation between DOD and DOS
on Section 1206 issues, and that all projects
are decided jointly, Gates also stated that:
“In my view, building partner capacity
is a vital and enduring military requirement
– irrespective of the capacity of other
departments – and its authorities and
funding mechanisms should reflect that
reality. The Department of Defense would
no more outsource this substantial and
costly security requirement to a civilian
agency than it would any other key military
mission.” 34
Moreover, the DOD appears to think that
countering terrorism (or criminal acts of terror)
is the exclusive preserve of the military,
but it is happy for the Department of State to
retain responsibility for training and equipping
thousands of military peacekeepers
under the Global Peace Operations Initiative
– with most of these activities actually
conducted by private contractors.
Extant U.S. aid – whether delivered by DOD
or DOS/USAID – is not geared towards
poverty reduction. The U.S. does not allocate
its development aid on the basis of neutrality;
it is concentrated around countries that are
political allies in the “war on terror.”
According to the 2006 National Strategy
for Countering Terrorism:
“We will continue to prevent terrorists
from exploiting ungoverned or under-governed
areas as safe havens – secure spaces
that allow our enemies to plan, organize,
train, and prepare for operations. … To
further counter terrorist exploitation of under-
governed lands, we will promote effective
economic development to help ensure
long-term stability and prosperity.”35
The U.S. now provides over half of its
global aid to 10 countries alone, in contrast
to the 5 percent it allocates among the
world’s 10 poorest countries. The current
The U.S. now
provides over half
of its global aid to
10 countries alone,
in contrast to the
5 percent it
allocates among
the 10 poorest
countries.
www.refugesinternational .org 10
administration’s engagement with weak and
failing states is motivated almost entirely by
traditional national security concerns, ignoring
the fact that a comprehensive strategy for
security and stability also requires addressing
good governance and development.
Development is severely compromised when
short-term security objectives are prioritized
over longer-term poverty reduction goals. It
becomes very difficult to hold U.S. aid agencies
accountable for poverty reduction results
-- and recipients of U.S. development funding
know that they can rely on a continuing
flow of assistance regardless of development
outcomes -- as long as they remain solely
aligned with U.S. military objectives.
Overhauling Foreign Assistance
In her testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee on 15 April 2008, Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice highlighted
the dangers of weak and failing states. She
reminded the Committee that President
Bush has designated the State Department
as a national security agency, and that failed
states “create holes in the fabric of the international
system where terrorists can arm
and train to kill the innocent, where criminal
networks can traffic in drugs and people and
weapons of mass destruction…” The Bush
administration’s response to this challenge is
‘transformational diplomacy’ – a civilian-led,
whole-of-government effort to “build and
sustain a world of democratic, well-governed
states that respond to the needs of their
people, that reduce widespread poverty, and
that conduct themselves responsibly in the
international system.”36
To address these challenges, the State
Department’s FY 2009 budget request seeks
to increase the size of the diplomatic corps
with 1,100 new positions for the Department
of State and 300 new positions for the U.S.
Agency for International Development.37
The Department of State has also launched a
Civilian Stabilization Initiative with the aim
of creating a rapid civilian response capability
for use in stabilization and reconstruction
environments. The idea is that elements
of this new team could be deployed alongside
of the U.S. military, with international
partners, or on their own. This is a good
first step towards increasing civilian capacity,
but such an initiative is still ad hoc and
not a comprehensive response to structural
deficiencies in the U.S. government.
A rusty sign marks the
headquarters for Liberia’s
disarmament, demobilization,
reintegration and
rehabilitation (DDRR)
program, which helps former
soldiers establish new
lives in their communities.
The U.S. Department of
State has minimal funding
or civilian capacity to support
programs like this that
are essential to rebuilding
war-torn societies.
©Refugees International
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL 11 LEVEL IN AFRICA
The Civilian Stabilization Initiative is based
on the establishment of three tiers of civilian
response capabilities: an Active Response
Corps of selected and specially trained
diplomats and interagency federal employees;
a Standby Response Corps of federal
employees; and a Civilian Reserve Corps
that will be comprised of private sector, local
government and civil society personnel with
relevant specialized skill sets. Following a
decision to take action, the objective is to be
able to deploy trained and equipped Active
Response Corps members to a conflict
zone within 48-72 hours of notification. The
larger force of Standby and Civilian Reserve
Corps members could then be mobilized
within two months. The President’s FY09
budget includes $248.6 million to launch
this capability.
Secretary Rice has been an unashamed
champion of the Building Global Partnerships
Act and the extension and expansion
of the Section 1206 authority. She is also
pushing hard for an extension and expansion
of Section 1207 authority, which would
give the State Department money to deploy
diplomats in support of U.S. military forces.
Whereas 1206 is a DOD-State Department
program with DOD lead, Section 1207 is a
State Department-DOD program with a DOS
lead. Congress authorized both programs
through the Defense Department because
they meet important military requirements.
Section 1207 allows DOD to transfer up to
$100 million to the Department of State to
bring civilian expertise to bear alongside
the military. DOD and State are now jointly
pushing Congress for a five-year extension of
Section 1207 and an increase in the authority
to $200 million.
Still, the Section 1206 and 1207 authorities
are ad hoc responses that will not provide a
coherent structure to meeting the world’s
development challenges. While Gates calls
the programs “terrific interagency partnerships,”
38 the notion of partnership, implies
an equitable relationship based on a balance
of power and interests. The current U.S. interagency
“partnership” is far from equitable,
with permanent DOD employees outnumbering
those of AID by a ratio of 750:1.
A recent RAND Corporation study confirms
that despite the common notion that civil
capabilities and military power are equally
important to counterinsurgency operations,
the meager and infrequent bump-ups in
the State Department’s budget have been
dwarfed by massive increases in Pentagon
spending. The report notes that, “… if
countering [Islamic] insurgency requires a
broad and balanced array of capabilities, the
grim implication is that the United States
is ill equipped to counter the gravest threat
it faces.”39 The authors estimate that the
United States would need to add thousands
of deployable civilian professionals and billions
more in targeted foreign aid to meet
counterinsurgency needs.
However, generating and sustaining popular
and legislative support for such substantial
increases in resources devoted to development
activities will require a broad consensus
among the American people regarding
the importance of international development
to America’s interests as well as its values.
Establishing a dedicated cabinet-level department
for foreign assistance and development
efforts -- a debate re-emerging within policy
circles in Washington -- will not change the
trend towards harnessing aid in pursuit of a
militarized national security in the absence
of consensus on a global development policy.
Structure should follow strategy, as form follows
function. The debate over a cabinet level
department for international development
should continue, but it must be informed by
robust discussions on a concrete and enduring
strategy for sustained and meaningful
foreign assistance.
The next U.S. administration will certainly
have to deal with urgent issues of strategy,
including the need to re-craft the National
Security Act of 1947 for the 21st century and
perhaps, in tandem, to initiate an overhaul of
the Foreign Assistance Act.40
The current
U.S. interagency
“partnership” is far
from equitable, with
permanent DOD
employees outnumbering
those of AID
by a ratio of 750:1.
www.refugesinternational .org 12
THE MARGINALIZATION OF AFRICA
IN U.S. FO REIGN POL ICY
While U.S. aid to Africa has doubled since
President Bush entered the White House in
2001, and is set to double again by 2010, it
is still relatively insignificant. For example,
U.S. aid to sub-Saharan Africa in the 45 years
from 1961 to 2005 was about half of what
the U.S. government spent in Iraq and
Afghanistan in 2007 alone.41 Moreover, since
the end of the Cold War era proxy wars in
Africa and the U.S. military debacle in
Somalia, the U.S. has failed to make any
significant investment in the enhancement
of African security – beyond its support for
UN peace operations on the continent.
The marginalization of Africa – especially
sub-Saharan Africa – is reflected in the
Foreign Military Financing budget request
for Fiscal Year 2009. According to the
government blurb:
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) furthers
U.S. interests around the world by ensuring
that coalition partners and friendly foreign
governments are equipped and trained to
work toward common security goals and
share burdens in joint missions. FMF promotes
U.S. national security by contributing
to regional and global stability, strengthening
military support for democratically-elected
governments, and containing transnational
threats including terrorism and trafficking
in narcotics, weapons, and persons. FMF is
allocated strategically within regions with
the vast majority of funds directed to our
sustaining partners and a significant proportion
to developing countries to support their
advancement to transforming status. 42
The total FY09 request for Africa is for
$12.55 million – 0.26% of the total FMF
amount of $4.812 billion – with more
than half of that going to GWOT partners
Djibouti and Ethiopia. For the Near East, the
UN peacekeepers patrol
in eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
While the U.S. continues
to rely on UN peacekeepers
to maintain peace and
security in Africa, Congress
frequently falls behind on
its share of funding for
UN peacekeeping.
©Refugees International
figure is nearly $4.2 billion, with Israel and
Egypt by far the primary beneficiaries ($2.55
billion and $1.3 billion respectively). Despite
the rhetoric, it is clear that the countries of
sub-Saharan Africa – with a combined total
of $3.5 million, or 0.08% of the FMF budget
– count for virtually nothing.
Africa’s proportional share of funded military
training opportunities in the USA is
much larger. According to the U.S. government,
the International Military Education
and Training (IMET) program is a key component
of U.S. security assistance, promoting
regional stability and defense capabilities
through professional military training
and education to students from “allied and
friendly nations.” The global sum allocated
to IMET in the FY09 budget is $90,500,000
– with 15% of this designated for 45 African
countries. However, there is no way to assess
the positive effects of IMET on African peace
and security (or for that matter, in combating
terrorism), and the program has been
criticized in the past for training officers who
have served despots like Mobutu Sese Seko
of Zaire.
The most – and most meaningful – financial
support to African peace and security currently
provided by the U.S. is undoubtedly
the money it contributes to UN peacekeeping.
UN peacekeeping in Africa is at a historic
high today, accounting for 70 percent
or more of the over 120,000 blue helmets
authorized by the UN Security Council
worldwide. The UN has increasingly proved
willing to intervene to help terminate civil
wars and establish rule of law in Africa and
other places where the U.S. cannot or does
not want to go. 43 To enable it to do so, the
UN depends heavily on the U.S. picking up
a little over a quarter of the cost of each mission.
This turnaround in UN engagement in
Africa remains absolutely critical to restoring
security on the continent. Whatever their
operational shortcomings, the UN and its
specialized agencies command respect and
support from almost every African government
and from all levels of African society. 44
However, the U.S., as a permanent and influential
member of the Security Council, continues
to approve mission after mission in
Africa while falling behind on its payments.
Two weeks prior to his African visit, on 4
February 2008, President Bush imperiled a
number of African countries emerging from
war to peace by releasing a FY 09 budget
request that significantly shortchanged UN
peacekeeping – asking for an amount that
was some $610m short of what it will owe
to peacekeeping for FY 09, and that would
bring America’s total arrears to the UN to
nearly $2bn.
In its desire to find and combat terrorism
in Africa, the DOD has oriented its major
regional initiatives in North and East Africa
along counterterrorism lines, despite the
fact that the GWOT simply does not rank
high on the list of African security priorities.
Although these programs have involved
efforts to improve governance and security
sector capacity, their potential benefits have
been overshadowed by short-term, kinetic
operations conducted by U.S. military forces
against suspected terrorists.
On January 7, 2008, for example, two U.S.
AC-130 gunships45 attacked a convoy of
trucks moving through the Somali fishing
village of Ras Kamboni, near the Kenyan
border. The targets were Abu Taha al-Sudani,
al-Qaeda’s leader in East Africa, and Saleh
Ali Saleh Nabhan, one of two suspected
operatives involved in the 1998 bombings of
the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
According to local Somalis, and confirmed
by western diplomats and aid officials in
Nairobi, a group of pastoralists were killed
in the U.S. attack, and none of the dead was
connected to al-Qaeda or the Islamic Courts.
The hunt for Nabhan and other suspects
continued and, on March 3, 2008, a U.S.
submarine launched two Tomahawk cruise
missiles that struck near Dhoobley, a remote
Somali town some 140 miles from the
Kenyan border. 46 The strike was aimed at a
“facility where there were known terrorists”
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL 13 LEVEL IN AFRICA
In its desire to find
and combat
terrorism in
Africa, the DOD has
oriented its major
regional initiatives
in North and East
Africa along counterterrorism
lines.
www.refugesinternational .org 14
affiliated with East African al-Qaeda operations.
According to the local district commissioner,
the missiles hit two houses, killing three women
and three children and wounding another
20 people. The Pentagon has not said whether
it believes Nabhan or any other terrorist suspects
were killed or wounded in the attack.
Using cruise missiles to target individual
suspects at great risk of collateral damage
raises a host of moral, ethical and legal
issues that are worthy of lengthy debate.
Beyond such issues, however, the concrete
numbers in the President’s FY 09 budget
point to a total lack of concern for security in
Somalia – where the world’s worst humanitarian
crisis continues to fester, eclipsing
even the scale of human suffering in the
Darfur region of the Sudan. In this hunting
ground for the U.S. military and its Ethiopian
allies in pursuit of Islamic jihadis, a
meager $11.6 million is allocated to “transforming
the Somali military into a professional
armed force capable of maintaining
national peace and security as part of a
multi-sectoral approach to post-conflict
security sector reform.”47
Somalia is not the only country being
neglected; the U.S. is in fact doing remarkably
little to help transform African armies
and security agencies into professional
organizations dedicated to protecting the citizenry
rather than abusing them. Civilian and
democratic control over security structures
– including armed forces, police, security
management and oversight bodies, and justice
and law enforcement institutions – may not
guarantee economic development, but they
are certainly a necessary precondition.
In an ideal world, security sector reform
(SSR) is an essential part of a comprehensive
post conflict peace-building process, where
the reform program derives from a comprehensive
national defense and security review.
It involves, at its core, the transformation of
The Temple of Justice in
Liberia is home to Liberia’s
court system. Liberia’s
judiciary and public
defenders receive some
training and supervision
from a U.S.-funded project
run by a private contractor,
PAE, but many parts of
the justice system still suffer
from a chronic lack of
qualified human resources
and funding.
©Refugees International
a country’s military and police forces, but it
also involves a comprehensive review and
restructuring of intelligence services, the
penitentiary, the judiciary, and other agencies
charged in some way with preserving
and promoting the safety and security of the
state and its citizenry.
However, in real-life war to peace transitions
in Africa, the process of security sector
reform – as supported by the international
community and bilateral donors – is often
far more rudimentary. It often is aimed simply
at the training and equipping of armed
forces and police agencies, with little attention
or resources being devoted to the other
components of the security system.
The U.S. contribution to SSR in Africa is
funded through the Peacekeeping Operations
(PKO) account. As stated in the administration’s
budget request: “PKO funding
provides security assistance to help diminish
and resolve conflict, … address counter-terrorism
threats, and, in the aftermath of conflict,
reforms military establishments into
professional military forces with respect for
the rule of law.…” The FY 09 request is for
a modest $247 million (down from a FY08
estimate of $261 million).48 Of this amount,
$96.75 million is dedicated to SSR activities
in only four countries in Africa, in a manner
that does not reflect at all the most pressing
reform priorities on the continent.
For example, $49.65 million is allocated to
“[complete] efforts to transform the Liberian
military into a professional two thousand
member strong armed force that respects
the rule of law and has the capacity to protect
Liberia’s borders and maintain adequate
security in the country.”49 While this support
is much needed and in the interests of stability
in the West African region, Liberia has a
total population of only three million people.
Its significance in terms of continental peace
and security pales in comparison to that of
the DR Congo – a country the size of Western
Europe with 65 million people in over
200 ethnic groups – where Africa’s “first
world war” has claimed the lives of over five
million people and where over a million
people have been displaced over the past year
alone as a result of continued violence in the
east. The DRC has a dysfunctional and malintegrated
army of 164,000 – 82 times the
size of that of Liberia. Yet the FY 09 request
is for a paltry $5.5 million, to “continue efforts
to reform the military in the DR Congo
into a force capable of maintaining peace
and security.” 50
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL 15 LEVEL IN AFRICA
Security sector
reform often is
aimed simply at the
training and equipping
of armed forces
and police agencies,
with little attention
or resources being
devoted to the other
components of the
security system.
www.refugesinternational .org 16
U.S. SECU RITY SECTO R REFO RM
EFO RTS IN LIBE RIA
Background
Fourteen years of civil war displaced nearly
one-third of Liberia’s population and took
the lives of approximately 250,000 people.
Prior to the outbreak of war in 1989, Liberia’s
rulers had developed systems of parallel
and informal governance that sidelined and
hollowed-out state institutions. They virtually
subcontracted the management of state security
and revenue resources to an informal
group of presidential associates – which led
inevitably to the collapse of the state bureaucracy
and security services.
A key feature of security institutions in
Liberia was the gross abuse of human rights
(often with impunity) by security personnel
through torture, arbitrary arrests and
killings, and the use of official powers for
private gains. Not surprisingly, by the time
of the August 2003 Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA), the population and
the transitional government were deeply
mistrustful of law enforcement and military
officials. Police and military officers were not
regarded as a source of protection, but rather
as entities to be feared.
The international community is now
supporting a multidimensional transition
from war to peace; from militant misrule
to rule of law. This support has coalesced
around the United Nations Mission in
Liberia (UNMIL). Established in September
2003, UNMIL has helped to restore relative
calm to the country by supporting and overseeing
the disarmament of over 100,000
combatants; the disbandment of former
armed factions; the partial restoration of
State authority in the counties; and the
launching of a security sector reform program.
The Liberian government’s Interim
Poverty Reduction Strategy (IPRS) prioritized
key development issues and challenges
into four pillars, namely:
On August 21, 2007, Liberia’s
Ministry of Defense
announced a recruitment
drive for the Armed Forces
of Liberia (AFL). However,
weak and erratic funding
from the U.S. has led to delays
in AFL development.
©Refugees International
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL 17 LEVEL IN AFRICA
1. Enhancing national security;
2. Revitalizing economic growth;
3. Strengthening governance and the rule of
law; and
4. Rehabilitating infrastructure and delivering
basic services.
Significantly, national security is the first
pillar. Responsibility (including financial
support) for the reconstitution of Liberia’s
security sector is shared between the U.S.
government, which is leading the reform
of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL); the
Liberian government (Ministry of Defense
and Ministry of Justice); and UNMIL, which
is implementing police reform. However,
the UN has not been effective in the broad
realm of security sector reform, and has not
had the conceptual framework or the means
to engage meaningfully in military transformation
processes. As explained in the UN’s
Capstone Doctrine for peace operations:
“Given their relatively short lifespan and
limited access to program funds and specialist
expertise, UN peacekeeping operations
are neither mandated nor resourced
to engage in the long-term peace-building
activities required to achieve the objectives
identified above. Other actors, both within
and outside the UN system, normally
undertake the bulk of this work.”51
SSR continues to slip into a systemic funding
vacuum, while the Security Council continues
to mandate missions to do SSR work
– hoping that a “lead nation” will step up
to the plate and provide both the leadership
and resources to reform the security sector
in host nations. For Liberia, the lead nation
has been the U.S.
The Legal Framework
Liberia’s post-war security architecture is
characterized by redundancy, inadequate
control, and incoherence. The present government
inherited no fewer than 15 separate
agencies and structures tasked with a variety
of security functions, some discrete and
some overlapping. Overarching responsibility
for developing national security strategy
and polices is supposed to be vested in the
National Security Council (NSC), created on
March 12, 1999 by an Act of Legislature.52
However, the Liberian government has not
yet produced this long-awaited National
Security Strategy and supplementary legislation
and policy documents.
In the absence thereof, SSR has been hastily
implemented within the convoluted legal
framework provided by the 1986 Constitution
of Liberia, the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) of 2003, and United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1509
(2003). The CPA provides specific criteria
for the restructuring of the Armed Forces of
Liberia (AFL); in particular specifying that
recruits would be screened with respect to
educational, professional, medical and fitness
qualifications and prior history of
human rights abuses. Further, it stressed
that the restructured army should reflect
regional balance within the country and that
the AFL’s mission shall be to defend Liberian
“national sovereignty and in extremis, respond
to natural disasters.” It also identifies
the UN, AU and other organizations for the
provision of staff, equipment and logistics,
and the U.S. as playing “a lead role” in organizing
the restructuring program.53
UN Security Council Resolution 1509
specifically stipulates that UNMIL shall
work with Liberia’s government to develop
a civilian police training program and
restructure the Liberian military.54 Although
the CPA is specific about the role of the U.S.
in the restructuring of the army, Resolution
1509 refers simply to “Interested States.”
From August 2003 to January 2006, the
CPA was the major source of legal authority
for SSR in Liberia, and even suspended parts
of the Liberian Constitution. However, the
inauguration of Mrs. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf
in January 2006 has again made the Constitution
of Liberia relevant to the process.55 As
The UN has not
been effective in the
broad realm of
security sector
reform, and has not
had the conceptual
framework or the
means to engage
meaningfully
in military
transformation
processes.
www.refugesinternational .org 18
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
Liberia, the President “appoints members of
the military from the rank of lieutenant or its
equivalence and above; and field marshals,
deputy field marshals and sheriffs.”56
There is obviously potential for debate and
argument as to which of these three documents
is legally supreme, but there is broad
agreement that the security sector should
be reformed and transformed.57 However,
there are strong differences of opinion within
Liberian civil society, and some of the security
agencies themselves, as to the nature and
scope of reform – and the rationale behind it.
The Conceptual Framework
In view of the role played by ill-governed and
predatory security institutions in the Liberian
civil wars, the success and sustainability of
rebuilding Liberia depends on a security
sector that can operate effectively, and within
a framework of effective democratic control.
Thus, the challenge before the national,
regional, and international communities lay
not just in rebuilding the Liberian military
and police force – but also in defining their
new roles in the post-conflict society and ensuring
effective oversight and management.
According to the IPRS, the government’s
medium-term approach is to “… develop
a national security strategy to guide security
sector reform, extend national security
actions to ensure national safety, security
and peace as well as build national security
capabilities.” The Governance Reform
Commission (GRC), the Ministry of Defense
(MoD) and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) are
supposed to lead this process. The IPRS also
commits the government to developing a:
“comprehensive longer-term operational
and institutional security reform agenda…
in order to rationalize various security
forces, facilitate a change in culture of the
security forces, define clear missions and
tasks and ensure there are no duplications,
overlap or conflicts of interest between
security agencies.”58
While the GRC is supposed to lead the development
of a national security strategy, it has
not succeeded in moving the process forward
at a satisfactory pace. The GRC has deep
concerns about the legal framework for SSR
and the roles of the various actors involved,
and how this is being interpreted and applied.
For example, while the CPA provided for the
U.S. to play a lead role in defense transformation,
the GRC contends that the U.S. SSR
Team is “muscling out everybody else” in the
area of defense sector transformation and
that the U.S.-driven process does not sufficiently
take into account the regional realities
and security situation. In particular, defense
(re)structuring is proceeding in isolation from
the ECOWAS security architecture, and does
not seem to be based on a thorough analysis
of the security dynamics of the Mano River
Basin. The Chairman of the GRC, Dr. Amos
Sawyer59 contends that the AFL is being
organized according to an apparently threatindependent
approach to defense planning
and structuring.60
The Defense Act of 1956, which framed
Liberia’s defense policy, was extremely controversial
and has been withdrawn by President
Johnson-Sirleaf. SSR Program staff
from the U.S. subsequently assisted MoD
staff with the drafting of a new Liberian
National Defense Act, in coordination with
and incorporating guidance from Minister
of National Defense Brownie Samukai and
Minister of Justice Counselor Frances Johnson-
Morris. The draft Act, which is similar to
the U.S. Title X, was completed by December
2006, but it is still being debated and vetted
by the Liberian legislature. According to Tom
Dempsey, who was on the faculty of the SSR
Program at the time, the draft Act “…delineated
the responsibilities and missions of
the Liberian Defense sector and established
a solid foundation for civilian control and
oversight of the Armed Forces of Liberia.”61
However, the GRC contends that the new
draft does not differ significantly from the
old Defense Act, and that there is a clear
need to first develop a comprehensive secu-
The success and
sustainability of
rebuilding Liberia
depends on a security
sector that can
operate effectively,
and within a framework
of effective
democratic control.
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL 19 LEVEL IN AFRICA
rity sector policy as well as an authoritative
defense policy which can then be enacted in
specific legislation. 62
The GRC attributes delays in the formulation
and promulgation of a national security
strategy and policy to a turf struggle between
the “security community,” UNMIL, and the
GRC. Amos Sawyer explains this as follows:
“The security community – including the
Ministry of Defense, the IGP, the SSR
Team and the National Security Advisor
– favors secrecy and ‘opaqueness.’ UNMIL
(which takes the lead on police reform)
feels that the UN Security Council is the
legitimate authority to provide direction to
the SSR process and that UNMIL should
therefore be the lead agency. The GRC
sees security sector reform as part and
parcel of human security policy and of the
overall governance reform agenda which
it leads.” 63
In the absence of an authoritative and
comprehensive National Security Strategy,
and attendant legislation and policies, the
only clear guidance for pursuing SSR in
Liberia remains the RAND Report, which
is based on international “best practices”
and clear, logical analysis rather than an indepth
understanding of Liberia and the West
African region. The RAND Report’s general
recommendation is that Liberia’s capabilities
architecture should respond to a security
concept whereby (a) public safety and law
enforcement are immediate concerns, (b)
the appearance of organized armed internal
opposition can be anticipated and prevented,
and (c) future external threats that may arise
without long warning can be countered.
The RAND Report rightly states that, even
with foreign assistance, Liberia’s economy
does not permit large forces,64 and that the
key to cost-effectiveness for Liberia’s security
forces is to have complementary capabilities
that cover the forces’ core security functions,
possess the right qualities, and can be
used flexibly. In addition to a reconstituted
police service and armed forces, the RAND
Corporation’s analysis of possible operational
contingencies also suggested a need for an
additional capability that would complete
and tie together currently planned capabilities:
a mobile unit of the LNP that can perform
either in a law-enforcement mode or
in combat. RAND therefore recommended
the establishment of a police quick-response
unit (QRU) that would complement the
regular police. Unlike the police support
unit, which is meant to deal with civil unrest
(e.g. riot control), the QRU would be capable
of defeating organized armed threats,
specifically where countering the formation
of armed opposition forces would extend
beyond the capabilities of regular police, yet
not warrant the domestic use of the army.65
Role of the new AFL and the
Security Sector Reform Program
In the absence of a valid National Defense
Act, the RAND Report again provides the
most credible direction for the establishment
of a new army, beginning with a definition of
the role and functions, as well as the posture
of the AFL. In particular, it notes that,
“At present, non-state external and internal
threats are more likely than threats from
neighboring states. The size of the AFL is less
important than that it be superior in quality
and capability to foreseeable threats.”66
Underpinning this RAND assessment is the
logic that the size, structure, and function of
the new AFL should be framed by financial,
regional, and historical concerns. According
to a former member of the SSR Program
staff, the government of Liberia therefore
envisioned an infantry force that was able
to move quickly while at the same time posing
no threats to its neighboring countries.
Rather than building a force with the capacity
to fight external threats, the new Liberian
government determined that the country
needed a force with the ability to patrol
borders, control immigration, and manage
criminality. Sean McFate elaborates:
The new Liberian
government
determined that the
country needed a
force with the
ability to patrol
borders, control
immigration, and
manage criminality.
www.refugesinternational .org 20
“The force must be postured so that it is
strong enough to defend the integrity of
the nation’s borders but not so strong that
it threatens neighbors with its force-projection
capability. Its structure, equipment,
and training must be appropriate to the
force’s mission (for example, Liberia does
not require F-16 fighter jets). Perhaps
most critically, the new security force must
not be so large that the government cannot
pay its salaries. Such a condition is a
precipitant to civil war.” 67
The United States pledged $210 million and
signed a Memorandum of Understanding
with the Interim Transitional Government
of Liberia, formalizing the U.S. role and
commitment, through the Security Sector
Reform Program, to assist in demobilizing
the existing Liberian military, recruiting and
vetting recruits for an entirely new force, and
then training, equipping and sustaining that
force until it was operational.
The most controversial facet of the SSR
Program is the framing of the national
security architecture by the RAND Corporation
and the use by the U.S. Department of
State of two private contractors to build it.
DynCorp International has been contracted
to provide basic facilities and basic training
for the AFL, and Pacific Architects and Engineers
(PAE) won the contract for building
some of the bases, for forming and structuring
the AFL and its component units,
and for providing specialized and advanced
training, including mentoring of the AFL’s
fledgling officer and non-commissioned
officer corps. DynCorp’s job is essentially to
“recruit and make soldiers,” while PAE is
employed to “mentor and develop” them into
a fully operational force. In addition to the
contracted trainers, the U.S. European Command
(EUCOM) is seconding eight active
duty officers and non-commissioned officers
to work alongside PAE in mentoring the
AFL commanders. While EUCOM will pay
Pacific Architects and
Engineers (PAE) is one of
two companies contracted
by the U.S. State Department
to support security
sector reform programs
in Liberia. The increasing
reliance on military
contractors reflects the
lack of civilian capacity
to oversee and implement
such overseas development
programs.
©Refugees International
Operating in
extremely dangerous
environments,
under-funded and
often isolated, Iraqi
organizations are
providing life-saving
assistance in many
parts of the country.
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL 21 LEVEL IN AFRICA
for these officers’ general service benefits,
PAE will provide them with accommodation
and vehicles.
The SSR Program has provided for the
demobilization of 13,770 soldiers who served
in the old AFL, allocating one-time payments
of between US$285 and $4,300, depending
on the seniority and length of service of demobilized
personnel. The SSR Program also
supported the demobilization of the Ministry
of National Defense, which had 400-450
personnel in its books, and the retraining of
select candidates. On March 20, 2007, 119
civilian employees of the Ministry of Defense
graduated after completing 17 weeks of training
offered by the U.S. Defense Department.
Recruitment and Training
The SSR program subsequently supported
the MoD with the recruiting and vetting of
an initial 12,100 applicants for service in the
new AFL. DynCorp designed, and continues
to manage, the ongoing recruiting and vetting
program. Given the long civil war, acute
suffering of civilians, and the widespread
atrocities committed by all of the armed
groups, the government of Liberia and the
SSR Program established a number of stages
by which to screen recruits for the new Liberian
army. As explained by McFate:
“The goal of the recruiting,
vetting, and
training components of security sector
reform is to achieve a force that maintains
a professional ethos, respects the rule of
law, cultivates
public service leadership, is
apolitical, and accepts civilian control with
transparent oversight mechanisms.”68
The vetting process has proved thorough.
There is concern for ensuring that the new
AFL reflects a healthy regional and ethnic
balance,69 and there has been a very strong
emphasis on ensuring that those with a history
of committing human rights abuses are
not admitted to the AFL. A vetting council,
comprised of a representative of the Ministry
of Defense, Liberian civil society, and
the United States Embassy, assesses each
candidate’s physical fitness, literacy level,
health, and human rights record. This body,
the Joint Personnel Board (JPB), is the final
arbiter of who gets accepted and who gets
rejected for training and service in the AFL.
The Government of Liberia decided that the
new AFL will be trained according to U.S.
Army doctrine, because this had been the
basis of the training of the old AFL. Every
soldier, irrespective of final mustering, is
first trained as an infantry rifleman during a
basic training – Initial Entry Training (IET)
course – which was 11 weeks long for the initial
intake. The period has subsequently been
reduced to 8 weeks by cutting three weeks
of training time initially devoted to human
rights training and education in civics and
civil-military relations in a democracy.
These subjects have been dropped from the
curriculum because of the high cost of basic
training. DynCorp instructors are all former
drill instructors from the U.S. Army or the
U.S. Marine Corps, or who have served in
their respective Corps Instruction Schools.
Their average age is 39 years; they are the
type of people who can command an excellent
rate of remuneration in the private
security industry in places such as Iraq and
Afghanistan. This drives up the DynCorp
salary bill. Training in civic consciousness,
human rights, and International Humanitarian
Law is therefore planned for a later stage
of training, after soldiers are assigned to
permanent units.
The training program is much like the
basic training presented in most armies; it
includes subjects such as personal hygiene,
drill, weapons instruction, field craft, and
land navigation. The facilities are designed
to accommodate a maximum of 550 recruits
and are functional, but by no means luxurious
or extravagant. The basic weaponry provided
to the AFL is compatible with that of
other countries in the region – AK-47 assault
rifles and RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade
launchers.70
The Government of
Liberia decided that
the new AFL will be
trained according to
U.S. Army doctrine.
www.refugesinternational .org 22
The New AFL
The end state for the AFL is a professional
army “… modeled on U.S. Army doctrine,
that will support the national objectives of
the Government of Liberia.”71 The SSR Program
plans to deliver, by September 2010,
an AFL that will essentially be comprised of
the 23rd Infantry Brigade. The total planned
strength of this brigade is 2,000 men and
women –146 officers and 1,854 enlisted
ranks. The 23rd Infantry Brigade will be
commanded by a colonel, and have a higher
headquarter element staffed by a total of
113 personnel.
The constituent units, sub units, and subsub
units of the brigade are planned as
follows:
• 1st and 2nd Battalions — light infantry battalions
each comprised of 680 soldiers,
and organized into a battalion headquarters,
three rifle companies and a combat
support company. The rifle companies will
each comprise a company headquarters
and three rifle platoons.
• An engineering company with a strength
of 220.
• A military police company with a strength
of 105.
• A Brigade Training Unit (BTU) with a
strength of 162.
• The band platoon with 40 members.
While the basic and specialized training of
enlisted ranks and junior officers is well
underway, there is clearly a gap when it
comes to senior command positions in the
AFL. Ideally, the appointment of the brigade
commander, battalion commander and
senior staff officers should have preceded
the formation, activation, and operationalization
of the 23rd Brigade. The Brigade
More than two years after
the launch of a UN-led
police training program in
Liberia, students were still
accommodated in these
rudimentary refugee camp
style tents.
©Refugees International
23
certainly cannot be declared operational until
such posts are filled by competent officers.
However, it generally takes 20-30 years of
military training and experience to create a
good brigade commander, and the AFL is
being created from scratch.
Funding and Resources
The SSR Program is funding every aspect of
the AFL (from bases and base maintenance
to uniforms and food during the initial training
phase), except salaries.72 However, according
to the ODC, the SSR Program is not
entirely a U.S. “closed shop,” as suggested
by the GRC and some civil society interlocutors.
There is a Defense Support Group for
Liberia, comprised of representatives of all
interested donor governments, which meets
quarterly in Monrovia. Assistance to the AFL
is being provided by other partners, sometimes
making up for shortfalls in essential
areas where needs cannot be met by the U.S.
team due to funding limitations.73
The funding for the SSR Program, including
the DynCorp and PAE contracts, is provided
through the PKO budget, as well as through
IMET (eight of the nine AFL officers who
graduated in May 2007, and two AFL noncommissioned
officers are currently on
courses in the USA, at Fort Bragg and Fort
Benning). Much has been said of the high
costs involved in standing up the AFL, with
the figure of $210 million having been
contested by many as extremely high. The
truth is that the SSR Program was never
fully funded. Funding to date has fallen far
short of this figure, and money has been
disbursed in dribs and drabs.
In the FY 07/08 budget, for example, only
$13 million was appropriated. This was
followed by a further $11 million transfer
from the Economic Support Fund (ESF) in
June 2007 and by $45 million in the July
2007 supplemental budget voted for Liberia,
although $5 million of this was allocated for
the establishment of a Police Quick Reaction
Unit and $5 million for support to the LNP
and Corrections Service. The remaining $35
million in the July 2007 supplemental was
not enough to see the SSR Program through
to conclusion, but it came just in time to
prevent the collapse of the recruitment and
basic training program. The Department of
State would not allow the commencement of
training for a further intake until the money
to pay them was secured.74 According to a
former senior DynCorp employee in Liberia,
the U.S. Department of State has been lax
in overseeing the process and promoting
an effective and sustained SSR program in
Liberia; in particular, it has been unwilling to
press Congress for increased funding.75
Weak and erratic funding is thus said to
be the main cause of the slow pace of AFL
development, with the timelines specified
in original contracts and agreed to with the
Liberian MoD slipping badly.76 Only 5% of
the force had completed the basic IET course
by August 2007.77 With the graduation of the
second intake on September 7, 2007, this
figure increased to 32% (604 plus 40 band
members). By the first week of February
2008, 57% of the force had completed basic
training; and by the first week of May 2008,
the figure was up to around 80% of the
2,000 troops.
Past delays in funding have significantly
increased the cost of basic training for recruits.
As previously mentioned, DynCorp’s
services are particularly expensive. In 2007,
the company employed 82 international staff
in Liberia, as well as 239 Liberian staff. The
thorough recruiting and vetting process,
including the services of expert investigators,
was both time consuming and very expensive.
Like other State Department contracts,
the DynCorp contract has been signed on
a “cost plus [overhead]” basis. Cost escalation
for goods and services, including idle
personnel time due to late disbursement of
funding, is therefore passed on directly to
the U.S. Government, and DynCorp has a
fixed “burn rate” for every month that it is
retained in Liberia. (The combined expenses
of DynCorp and PAE totaled $18 million in
the first six months of 2007.)78
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA
It generally takes
20-30 years of
military training
and experience to
create a good
brigade commander,
and the AFL is
being created
from scratch.
www.refugesinternational .org 24
UNMIL has also expressed concern about
delays in establishing an operational AFL,
because time frames for the drawdown and
ultimate withdrawal of UNMIL forces are
closely linked to AFL (and LNP) capacity
to assume responsibility for the territorial
integrity of Liberia.79 As the drawdown plans
for the UNMIL force include benchmarks
that are directly linked to AFL capacity,
delays in meeting SSR Program targets may
well lead to additional expenses for the U.S.,
given the $722 million annual budget of
UNMIL, of which the U.S. is assessed to pay
nearly $190 million.80
Transparency and Accountability
Liberian civil society groups and some
government officials have complained of
lack of transparency regarding the contract
between the U.S. Department of State and
DynCorp. (Little is said of PAE, probably
because DynCorp is far more visible and
in the media limelight.) The concerns are
mainly about several controversies involving
DynCorp in other countries,81 perceived lack
of performance by DynCorp in Liberia, and
lack of consultation with Liberian stakeholders
on the military transformation process.
According to Pajibo and Woods, for example:
“After more than two years in Liberia…
DynCorp has not only failed to train the
2,000 men it was contracted to train, it has
also not engaged Liberia’s legislature or its
civil society in defining the nature, content,
or character of the new army.” 82
The U.S. response to such criticism, from
the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC)
Chief in Liberia, is broadly as follows: a)
The details of the contracts with DynCorp
and PAE may not be revealed, not even to
the Government of Liberia, as it is against
U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulations; b)
The U.S. is providing gratis assistance to
Liberia for the restructuring of its armed
forces through an assistance package that
the Liberian government has approved and
accepted; c) The Government of Liberia is
entitled to query and get information on the
design of the new AFL (which it has agreed
to) and on progress made in implementing
agreed plans and on the quality of equipment
and training provided to the AFL; and
d) The U.S. Government, in turn, accepts its
responsibility to deliver promised and agreed
assistance though the SSR program, and to
effectively oversee the services of the contractors
that it hires to do the job.
The U.S. view is not shared by the GRC,
which complains that the build-up of the
AFL is being done in a very insular way, one
which pays lip-service to the concept of Security
Sector Reform and which is not linked to
a broader security sector policy. While international
SSR guidelines call for a consultative
process of security sector reform, there
is strong resistance to a public discourse on
security from the Liberian authorities – the
Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Justice, the
Presidency, and the IGP – as well as the SSR
Program team. Liberians in general assume,
because of the past, that security issues are
secret in nature, and that they should not be
discussed openly. 83
According to Sawyer, “the image of DynCorp
creating an armed elite is disconcerting to
many Liberians.” He recalls that in 1980,
the U.S. Government spent $500 million to
train and equip the army of then president
Samuel Doe, and adds that “every armed
group that plundered Liberia over the past
25 years had its core in these U.S.-trained
AFL soldiers.” 84 There is thus a fear that
when the U.S. withdraws support for its
SSR program and funding for the AFL,
Liberia will be sitting on a time bomb – a
well trained and armed force of elite soldiers
who are used to good pay and conditions
of service, which may be impossible for the
government of Liberia to sustain on its own.
Contractors Are Not the Answer
Outside of Europe, a multi-sectoral, wholeof-
government approach to SSR may be conceptually
valid, but unworkable in practice.
In Africa, donor countries have generally not
had the fortitude to see comprehensive pro-
There is thus a fear
that when the U.S.
withdraws support for
its SS R program and
funding for the AFL ,
Liberia will be sitting
on a time bomb.
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL 25 LEVEL IN AFRICA
cesses through, and recipient countries have
not had the financial and human resource
capacity to implement or sustain ambitious,
overarching SSR programs. Nevertheless,
much more can be done to actually arrest insecurity
within a conceptually and practically
more modest program that focuses primarily
on military and criminal justice reform. It
is clear that both the UN and the U.S. have
made a start with police and military reform,
but they have not done nearly enough towards
accomplishing the SSR goals laid out
in Resolution 1509 and the CPA respectively.
Sierra Leone faced similar, if not much
larger and more urgent, SSR challenges than
Liberia. The United Kingdom supported
the enhancement of short- and longer-term
security in Sierra Leone through a program
aimed at training, equipping and advising
government security forces. This program
involved the integration of UK military
advisors, serving British officers, into Sierra
Leone forces; close co-ordination with UNAMSIL
and the Sierra Leone Police; and the
enhancement of the combat effectiveness of
the forces through ongoing advice and training.
The UK advisors made sure that the
armed forces were operationally proficient
and capable of conducting effective joint patrols
with UN forces, before UNAMSIL withdrew.
The UK also seconded a senior British
police officer to take charge as IGP; it set up
an effective Office of National Security, and
helped produce a comprehensive national
security strategy and defense policy.
The UK’s efforts in Sierra Leone stand in
stark contrast to the U.S.’s SSR Program,
which after two years amounted to little
more than processing groups of admittedly
well screened recruits through boot camp.
The job is being done by private contractors,
by trainers who are all former U.S. soldiers,
but who have opted out of their national
military and chosen a “paramilitary” occupation
with a stronger cash-work nexus. While
contractors may be good at providing basic
and even advanced infantry training, they are
certainly not the ideal role models to instill
in the AFL the notion of duty to country
and military service ethics – including the
democratic principle of civil supremacy over
the military. Indeed, in a country and region
where recent history has been shaped by
warlords and mercenaries, the U.S. Department
of State has shown remarkable insensitivity
by sending in contractors to shape the
new army.
Assistance with military reform is clearly
best provided by active duty military personnel
who are directly accountable to the U.S.
government. However, the narrow focus of
the Liberia SSR Program – almost exclusively
on the AFL -- is indicative of the lack of
U.S. government civilian capacity to engage
robustly and effectively in the other dimensions
of SSR. There is clearly a need for a
cadre of federal government employees who
can oversee police reform and help build
local capacity in prison services, judicial
services, intelligence services, border control,
and customs and immigrations – as well as
within the appropriate legislative and departmental
oversight mechanisms for these
elements of the security and justice sector.
In a country…
where recent
history has been
shaped by warlords
and mercenaries,
the U.S. Department
of State has
shown remarkable
insensitivity by
sending in contractors
to shape the
new army.
www.refugesinternational .org 26
SECU RITY SECTO R REFO RM EFO RTS
IN THE DR CONGO
Background
With a population of 65 million and over
200 ethnic groups in a country that is one
quarter the size of the United States, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is
a country with a very violent history, from
the period of Belgian colonization to the
32 years of ruthless dictatorship of Mobutu
Sese Seko. A massive inflow of refugees in
1994 from fighting in Rwanda and Burundi
caused ethnic strife and civil war, sparking
the overthrow of the Mobutu regime in
May 1997 by a rebellion backed by Rwanda
and Uganda and fronted by Laurent-Désiré
Kabila. On 10 July 1999, the Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement was signed by the major
parties involved in the war.
A small UN observer mission was deployed
to monitor the cease-fire in August 1999.
This became the United Nations Mission
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUC) in November 1999 – a mission
that, after many mandate adjustments over
the ensuing years, eventually grew into the
largest and most expensive UN peace operation
ever deployed. Yet the Eastern part of
the country has remained in turmoil to date,
with rebel groups, financed in part by illegal
extraction of resources, continuing to operate
with seeming impunity. Eight years after
Lusaka and a year after democratic elections,
the people of the Kivus are still at the mercy
of thousands of armed belligerents fighting
for and against the Congolese government,
and often among themselves. The armed
groups all have one thing in common. Without
exception, they have preyed off the local
population and committed gross human
rights abuses.
By 2005 MONUC’s most important task was
ensuring that national elections went ahead
as planned for 2006.85 To accomplish this task
MONUC supported the newly-constituted
Forces Armées de la République Démocratique
du Congo86 (FARDC) in prosecuting a counterinsurgency
campaign against recalcitrant
armed groups operating in the east. The
campaign was at best partially successful,
but after the 2006 elections, primary responsibility
for the intractable security problems,
incomplete disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration (DDR) processes, and protection
challenges in the eastern DRC was
shifted from MONUC to the government
of the DRC. President Kabila has set 2009
as the target for the DRC to take over full
responsibility for the security of the country.
MONUC continues to ‘support the transition’
and to provide training and operational
assistance to the government forces.
Security sector reform (SSR), especially
military reform, is key to meeting the
remaining disarmament and civilian
protection challenges in the DRC. However,
it has not been pursued with sufficient vigor
to actually enhance security in the eastern
Congo. Rather, an inadequately resourced
and supported SSR program has contributed
to the FARDC becoming a major source of
insecurity for civilian communities in the
east. While the U.S. Department of State is
concerned about the humanitarian situation
in the east, and has played a very active role
in facilitating dialogue among belligerents,
the DRC seems to be a very low priority for a
Department of Defense that is preoccupied
with GWOT priorities.
Military “Integration” in the DRC
While the U.S. government may be criticized
for what it is doing in the realm of military
reform in Liberia, it should be criticized
mainly for what it is not doing in support
of military reform in the DRC. Given the
level of suffering endured by the Congolese
people and strategic importance of the DRC
– not only in terms of minerals for the West
and China, but also for the future stability of
the Great Lakes region and sub-Saharan Africa
– the U.S. administration’s level of support
is shockingly small. Indeed, the FY 09
request – for $5.5 million to “continue efforts
to reform the military in the Democratic
Given the level of
suffering endured by
the Congolese people
and strategic
importance of the
DRC… the U.S.
administration’s
level of support is
shockingly small.
Republic of the Congo into a force capable
of maintaining peace and security” – smacks
of tokenism. 87
In the absence of a strong lead nation,
MONUC was unable to rally donor support
for military reform, and it has become
increasingly apparent that the Congolese
government prefers bilateral agreements to
meaningful international coordination, so as
to extract as much as possible from individual
donor countries.
With the disarmament of all armed groups
in the DRC far from complete, donor
governments supported the build-up of a
new Congolese army through a process of
integration of the disparate armed forces that
were signatory to the April 2003 “Global and
All-inclusive Peace Agreement” for the DRC.
This process, called brassage, was conceived
as an emergency measure rather than strategically-
planned process of defense sector
reform. African mediators proposed the
plan, which was supposed to begin with all
armed forces regrouping under the authority
of the Chief of General Staff. The creation of
a number of infantry brigades was planned
to occur sequentially, beginning with a census
of all combatants eligible for integration
into the FARDC, followed by disarmament
at assembly points and transportation to
orientation centers, where individuals could
elect for demobilization or a career in the
integrated army. Those electing for military
service were then to be organized into standard
brigades of 4,200 troops and training
of the new brigades at six Centres de Brassage
(CBRs), after which nine brigades would be
deployed to the eastern provinces. A further
nine brigades were also to be integrated and
deployed to the rest of the country before the
elections in March 2006.
Due to capacity constraints, centers were not
established for the identification of combatants
for the DDR process. Consequently,
the FARDC, supported by various donor
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL 27 LEVEL IN AFRICA
An estimated 1.1 million
people are displaced in
North and South Kivu
provinces in eastern Congo
and forced to live with
neighbors or in camps like
this one outside of Goma.
With minimal support
going toward reform of
the Congolese military, the
Congolese army is better
known for preying on
civilian communities than
protecting them.
©Refugees International
countries, took responsibility for regrouping
the combatants and transporting them
directly to the CBRs, resulting in combatants
bypassing the orientation centre phase.
Individuals were grouped together and
groups were topped up with new arrivals
until brigade strength was reached at which
time the whole group entered a 45-day basic
training program, upon completion of which
the group became a numbered “Integrated
Brigade.” Substantive training was supposed
to take place after the newly formed
brigades were deployed from the CBRs to
the operational areas. The training of the
first integrated brigade with assistance from
the Belgian government began in February
2004 at the CBR in Kisangani.88 While the
Belgian-run training was regarded as successful,
the living conditions at the CBRs in
Mishaki and Luberizi were so appalling that
between March and August 2005 an estimated
2,500 out of 6,000 troops assembled
there deserted.
Brassage in the DRC was at most a process
of amalgamation, rather than integration
or even assimilation. The result of brassage
is a national army that is out of control, at
least by democratic and professional military
standards. Command and control are weak
and unstructured. The army lacks cohesion
and basic operational capability. FARDC
exactions and harassment of the local
population continue in virtually all areas of
deployment. Soldiers take their families with
them on operations, where they often live in
far worse conditions than the thousands of
displaced civilians. Government troops have
been responsible for serious human rights
violations, including sexual violence, which
remains rife in eastern DRC. Illicit taxing by
government forces is ubiquitous. FARDC
elements cooperate with the FDLR, the remnants
of the Hutu forces that committed the
genocide in Rwanda, who they are supposed
to disarm, sharing looted items and taxes
and the proceeds from gold and coltan mining
operations. Serious criminal acts, such
as murder and rape, go unpunished.
Moreover, President Kabila does not trust his
military staff in Kinshasa, and issues orders
directly to his regional commanders and
brigade commanders in the field. Not one
written operational order has been issued,
and there are no written administrative and
logistic reports within the FARDC. According
to the MONUC Force Commander:
“The national authorities, FARDC and
PNC [Congolese National Police], remain
the leading perpetrators of human rights
abuses in the country …Until such time as
the Security Sector Reform (SSR) is effectively
implemented, the civilian population
will remain at high risk of human rights
violations at the hands of rebel groups and
Congolese Law Enforcement and Security
Agencies.”89
It is difficult to see how the Congolese
government and those countries that assisted
with the process convinced themselves
that cohesive, operationally proficient and
combat effective brigades could be formed in
such a short space of time. In most armies of
the world, the formation of an effective platoon
takes at least six months. The building
of the small, single-brigade Liberian army
is scheduled to take at least three years and
the brigade will be thoroughly evaluated by
the U.S.-sponsored SSR Program before it is
operationally deployed.
The European Contribution
It is evident that real military reform in
the DRC requires work on the base of the
FARDC. Human resource management systems
must be developed and implemented,
administrative and logistic systems created,
new training schools and barracks built, etc.
For the past few years, the European Union
(EU) has attempted to partner with the
Congolese government in supporting such a
process. Following an official request by the
DRC government, the EU decided to establish
an EU advisory and assistance mission
– the EU Security Sector Reform Mission
(EUSEC) in the DR Congo. The mission is
intended to provide advice and assistance to
www.refugesinternational .org 28
Government troops
have been responsible
for serious human
rights violations,
including sexual
violence, which
remains rife in
eastern DRC.
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL 29 LEVEL IN AFRICA
the Congolese authorities in charge of security
while ensuring the promotion of policies
that are compatible with human rights and
international humanitarian law, democratic
standards, principles of good public management,
transparency and observance of the
rule of law. The mission was launched on
June 8, 2005, with French General Pierre
Joana as head.
The first priority of EUSEC was to provide
technical expertise to the GoDRC on issues
of military command and control, budgetary
and financial management, training,
accountancy and dealing with contracts and
tenders. A project known as ‘EUSEC FIN’
– aimed at setting up a chain of payment
system for the FARDC – was launched on
December 1, 2005 to target one of the key
weaknesses of the FARDC: the embezzlement
of a considerable part of the soldiers’
salaries at various points in the chain of
command, and the issue of ‘ghost soldiers’
on the military payroll.90
The basis of the EUSEC FIN project is
to separate the payment chain from the
command chain, so that corrupt commanders
cannot help themselves at each level
of command. The idea is to simplify the
payment procedure of salaries and reduce
the risk of embezzlement of funds. EUSEC
FIN involves the deployment of a number
of international advisors in the chain of payment
system, down to brigade level units.
EUSEC is also working on the compilation
of an accurate biometric personnel database,
which is a sine qua non for improving human
resources management.
The current estimate is that there are
164,000 members on the FARDC payroll
(30,000 of them “ghosts”), and a further
80-90,000 individuals awaiting registration
and brassage.91 There is an urgent need to
demobilize approximately 40,000 redundant
FARDC soldiers. More than 30,000 FARDC
personnel are over 60 years of age, and there
is no military pension system in place. The
resultant army is bloated, and the military
hierarchy is badly skewed – about 33% of
the FARDC are officers; 44% are warrant
officers and non-commissioned officers; and
only 30% are privates. According to EUSEC,
the FARDC should be reduced in number to
around 70,000 personnel.
While the Government of the DRC needs
considerable help with defense restructuring
and the build-up of a professional army,
there is a chronic lack of international funding
for such a process. The EUSEC team
consists of 49 personnel from 13 different
EU member states, but EUSEC cannot access
any money at all from the European
Commission’s development assistance
budget. Although it is widely accepted that
security is a prerequisite for development, no
funding mechanism has yet been found to
convert this common wisdom into tangible
funding for the establishment of capable and
sustainable defense forces.
MONUC and bilateral partners have
therefore engaged in low-level capacity
building rather than defense sector reform.
MONUC has merely been holding the line,
keeping a lid on the FARDC in attempt to
prevent force disintegration and the widespread
commission of human rights abuses,
while using the FARDC to stabilize the
eastern DRC.
Real Commitment Needed
The current situation of military mal-integration
and ongoing insecurity in the eastern
DRC stems from a transition process that
was fundamentally flawed. Elections were
held with sub-national armed groups still
operative, and long before the creation of
a unified and integrated national military.
Although security sector reform – or more
pertinently defense sector transformation
– was acknowledged as the key to meeting
the remaining disarmament and civilian
protection challenges, it was not pursued
with sufficient vigor to actually enhance
security in the eastern Congo. Rather, an
inadequately resourced and supported SSR
program has resulted in the FARDC becoming
a major part of the security problem for
civilians, rather than the solution.
While the
Government of the
DRC needs
considerable help
with defense
restructuring and
the build-up of a
professional army,
there is a chronic
lack of international
funding for
such a process.
www.refugesinternational .org 30
Building new armed forces from the base up
will require 10-15 years of sustained effort by
the Government of the DRC as well as longterm
and coordinated international support
for the effort. The DRC does not so much
need more technical military assistance, in
the form of training and equipment. The
real need is for assistance with military organization,
professional military socialization,
and the institution of effective command
and control. However, there is a lack of
international coordination and cooperation,
as well as a lack of coordination and cooperation
among Congolese institutions on these
issues. The heart of the matter is that there
is a total lack of willingness to actually deal
with SSR beyond the level of rhetoric.
The Congolese government and its international
partners – including the U.S. – need
to accept and deal with the real need for
assistance – for military organization, professional
military education and socialization,
and the institution of effective command
and control. If a relapse into civil war is to be
averted over the medium to long term, and
the ongoing human rights abuses halted, the
UN Security Council, MONUC, the “P3+2,”92
the European Union, the Contact Group,
and others who are dabbling in military assistance
to the DRC, must get a grip on the
real challenges of defense sector transformation
in the DRC and be prepared to commit
resources for the long term.
Building new armed
forces from the
base up will require
10-15 years of
sustained effort…
An Iraqi Shiite woman
takes care of her sick baby
inside a makeshift camp,,
for displaced people in
Baghdad. The Government
of Iraq must devise
and implement a plan to
address the humanitarian
needs of displaced and other
vulnerable Iraqis.
©REUTERS/Ceerwan Aziz
31 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA
THE UN ITED ST ATES AFRICA
COM AND (AFRICOM )
Background
Unified and specified combatant commands
were first described by statute in the U.S.
National Security Act of 1947, and three such
commands have been operating in Africa for
decades: European Command (EUCOM),
Central Command (CENTCOM) and Pacific
Command (PACOM).93 On October 1, 2008,
AFRICOM will assume mission responsibility
as a Unified Command, and serve as the
Department of Defense lead for support to
U.S. Government agencies and departments
responsible for implementing U.S. foreign
policy in Africa.
U.S. foreign and security policies that played
out in Africa during the Cold War, however,
have made African leaders suspicious of
U.S. intentions with the new combatant
command. For many African leaders and analysts,
AFRICOM is, along with the interventions
in Iraq and Afghanistan, another sign
that the U.S. is seeking to re-assert American
power and hegemony globally. The view
remains widespread that AFRICOM is a tool
to secure better access to Africa’s natural resources,
erode China’s growing influence on
the continent, and establish forward bases to
hunt and destroy networks linked to al-Qaeda.
As one Nigerian journalist puts it:
“Energy supplies are concentrated in those
countries where a mix of internal social
tensions, radical Islamism and anti-Americanism
has produced a fertile breeding
ground for militancy and terrorism. Oil
platforms, tankers, pipelines, expatriate
workers and the whole integrated infrastructure
of the petroleum industry are
extremely vulnerable to attacks.”94
While the Pentagon has gone to great
lengths to deny anything but a desire to
“help Africans help themselves” in its public
diplomacy efforts, it is common knowledge
that key members of the Bush administration,
as well as some legislators and influential
U.S. think tanks, have become more and
more alarmed by the growing efforts of
China to expand its access to energy supplies
A Senegalese soldier
holds two U.S. soldiers
prisoner during a “Visit,
Board, Search and Seizure”
military exercise using
dummy weapons on the
USS Fort McHenry in
Dakar’s harbor in April
2008. Such military training
will be continued as one
of the security assistance
programs of the new Africa
Command (AFRICOM).
©Refugees International
www.refugesinternational .org 32
and other resources from Africa and to
enhance its political and economic influence
throughout the continent. It is easy to assume,
therefore, that AFRICOM is a response to
these developments.
Posture and Promises
The initial reaction of the Office of the
Secretary for Defense to African concerns
about AFRICOM was to disparage them.
Senior officials such as Ryan Henry, Principal
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy,
denied what he described as myths, stating
categorically that AFRICOM is not being
established in support of the war on terrorism,
and that it will not be concerned with
securing U.S. oil interests and/or countering
Chinese influence in Africa. For example,
in June 2007, Mr. Henry explained to the
foreign press that:
“The missions that AFRICOM will emphasize
are those of humanitarian assistance,
civic action …and response to natural disasters.…
[T]he deputy for the command…
will be a senior civilian from the State Department
so that we can integrate with the
diplomatic aspects.… [We] will also have a
large percentage of civilians from different
parts of the U.S. government integrated
into the command, because our engagement
on the continent is one of diplomacy,
of development and where we can be of
assistance to Africans. And having an integrated
staff will help us to do a better job
in integrating with those other parts of the
U.S. government’s engagement.” 95
The specter of integration was as unpalatable
for humanitarians as it was for Africans, as
there was clear ignorance of core humanitarian
principles of Humanity, Impartiality,
Neutrality and Independence. The observance
of these principles is essential in order
to maintain the trust of all sides of a given
conflict, and to maintain access to victims,
while the DOD was co-opting the language
and aims of humanitarianism for political
and military purposes. The DOD eventually
took note of such criticism, and has amended
the thrust of its public diplomacy accordingly.
Since his confirmation as AFRICOM
Commander last September, General Ward
has also done much to set the record
straight, emphasizing not new and complex
possibilities on the humanitarian and
developmental front, but rather the value his
Command can add to extant U.S. security
assistance programs in Africa.
In his April 2008 statement to Congress
on AFRICOM’s posture, General Ward
outlined the following aims and objectives
for the command, “in support of vital
national interests”:
• to prevent attacks emanating from Africa
against Americans,
• to secure U.S. strategic access, and
• to preserve unhindered movement along
lines of communication in AFRICOM’s
Area of Responsibility.
To achieve these ends, AFRICOM will
adopt a strategy of Active Security that will
focus on establishing and sustaining reliable
partnerships while developing security
partner capacity at the theater, regional,
and state levels.96 Ward defined Active Security
as “a persistent and sustained level
of effort oriented on security assistance
programs that prevent conflict and foster
continued dialogue and development.” The
goal of Active Security is “to enable the
work of Africans to marginalize the enemies
of peace and prevent conflict, thereby
enabling the growth of strong and just
governments and legitimate institutions to
support the development of civil societies.”
General Ward added that “AFRICOM
will contribute to this goal by employing a
wide range of tools at its disposal – from
conducting security cooperation activities
to prosecuting combat operations.”97
Although it promises sustained African capacity
building assistance, General Ward’s
concept of Active Security is thus clearly
driven by U.S. national security interests
and the imperatives of GWOT.
General Ward has
also done much to set
the record straight,
emphasizing… the
value his Command
can add to extant U.S.
security assistance
programs in Africa.
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL 33 LEVEL IN AFRICA
Two of the U.S. military’s most significant
African security cooperation programs –
Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara
and the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of
Africa – carry a mandate directly linked to
the Global War on Terrorism.98 Since their
inception, these initiatives have placed U.S.
counterterrorism efforts within a larger
framework of development, long-term
counterinsurgency, and a campaign to win
“hearts and minds.” However, U.S. operations
in North and East Africa have nonetheless
relied on “kinetic” military operations
focused on short-term objectives, such as
those in Somalia discussed above.
Extant U.S. Security Programs
in Africa
AFRICOM is not being created entirely from
scratch. When the command becomes fully
operational on October 1, 2008, it will take
over responsibility for the implementation of
a range of ongoing military, security cooperation,
and security assistance programs,
which are funded through either the State
Department or the Defense Department.
The U.S. provides military training to
African military personnel through a wide
variety of training and education programs.
In addition, it conducts military exercises
in Africa jointly with African and European
troops to provide training to others as well
as to train its own forces for possible deployment
to Africa in the future. Extant programs
in Africa include the following:99
• Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET)
exercises, conducted primarily by units
of the U.S. Army Special Forces and the
U.S. Army Rangers, to provide training
experience both for American troops and
for the troops of African countries. JCETs
were conducted in 2005 and 2007 as part
of Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans-
Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership
(TSCTP) which now links the U.S. with
Mali, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Nigeria,
Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. The TSCTP
received some $31 million in FY 2006,
nearly $82 million in FY 2007, and is
expected to receive approximately $100
million annually from FY 2008 through
FY 2013.
• Africa Contingency Operations Training
and Assistance Program (ACOTA). This
program, which began operating in 2002,
is now part of the Global Peace Operations
Initiative (GPOI). ACOTA is officially
designed to provide training to African
military forces to improve their ability to
conduct peacekeeping operations. By FY
2007, nineteen African countries were
participating in the ACOTA program. It
is impossible to ascertain exact levels of
funding for ACOTA, since its funding is
subsumed within the budget for GPOI.
• International Military Education and
Training Program (IMET). The IMET
program brings African military officers
to military academies and other military
educational institutions in the United
States for professional training. Nearly
all African countries participate in the
program. In FY 2006 14,731 students from
the African continent (excluding Egypt) participated
in IMET at a cost of $14.7 million.
• Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS).
The FMS program sells U.S. military
equipment to African countries; such sales
are conducted by the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency of the Defense Department.
The U.S. government provides loans
to finance the purchase of virtually all of
this equipment through the Foreign Military
Financing Program, but repayment
of these loans by African governments is
almost always waived, so that they amount
to free grants. In FY 2006, sub-Saharan
African countries received a total of nearly
$14 million in FMF funding, and the
Maghreb countries of Morocco and Tunisia
received almost another $21 million; for
FY 2007, the Bush administration requested
nearly $15 million for sub-Saharan Africa
and $21 million for Morocco and Tunisia;
and for FY 2008, the administration
When the
command becomes
fully operational…
it will take over
responsibility for
the implementation
of a range of ongoing
military, security
cooperation, and
security assistance
programs.
www.refugesinternational .org 34
requested nearly $8 million for sub-
Saharan Africa and nearly $6 million
for the Maghreb.
• African Coastal and Border Security
Program (ACBS Program). This program
provides specialized equipment (such as
patrol vessels and vehicles, communications
equipment, night vision devices,
and electronic monitors and sensors) to
African countries to improve their ability
to patrol and defend their own coastal waters
and borders from terrorist operations,
smuggling, and other illicit activities. In
some cases, airborne surveillance and
intelligence training also may be provided.
In FY 2006, the ACBS Program received
nearly $4 million in FMF funding, and the
Bush administration requested $4 million
in FMF funding for the program in FY
2007. No dedicated funding was requested
for FY 2008, but the program may be
revived in the future.
• Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
(CJTF-HOA) In October 2002, the U.S.
Central Command played the leading role
in the creation of this joint task force that
was designed to conduct naval and aerial
patrols in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden,
and the eastern Indian Ocean as part of
the effort to detect and counter the activities
of terrorist groups in the region. Based
at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, long the
site of a major French military base, the
CJTF- HOA is made up of approximately
1,400 U.S. military personnel (sailors,
Marines, and Special Forces troops) that
work with a multi-national naval force
composed of American naval vessels along
with ships from the navies of France, Italy,
and Germany, and other NATO allies.100
• Joint Task Force Aztec Silence (JTFAS).
In December 2003, the U.S. European
Command created this joint task force
under the commander of the U.S. Sixth
Fleet (Europe) to carry out counter-terrorism
operations in North and West
Africa and to coordinate U.S. operations
with those of countries in those regions.
Specifically, JTFAS was charged with conducting
surveillance operations using the
assets of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and to share
information, along with intelligence collected
by U.S. intelligence agencies, with
local military forces.
• Naval Operations in the Gulf of Guinea.
Although American naval forces operating
in the Gulf of Guinea and other areas
along Africa’s shores are formally under
the command of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, and
other U.S. Navy commands, AFRICOM
will help coordinate naval operations along
the African coastline. For example, on
October 16, 2007 the U.S.S. Fort McHenry
began a seven-month deployment to the
Gulf of Guinea. The amphibious dock
landing ship serves as a platform for the
Africa Partnership Station (APS) initiative,
which aims to work cooperatively with
U.S. and international partners in promoting
maritime security in Western Africa.
The Fort McHenry will serve as a “floating
schoolhouse” to train local forces in port
and oil-platform security, search-and rescue
missions, and medical and humanitarian
assistance.
The APS initiative is the first U.S. operation
in the sub-region since the launch of
AFRICOM in February 2007. According to
General Ward, the initiative,
“provides a good example of what the newly
established U.S. Africa Command is all
about as it relates to helping our partner
nations on the continent of Africa build
their capacity to better govern their spaces
(and) to have more effect in providing for
the security of their people.”101
There can be little doubt that the extant
programs, including the APS, will constitute
the core of AFRICOM’s activities for the
foreseeable future. This was indeed confirmed
during a press briefing at the African
Union headquarters on November 8, 2007,
where General Ward concluded his statement
The Africa Partnership
Station initiative…
aims to work
cooperatively with
U.S. and international
partners in promoting
maritime security in
Western Africa.
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL 35 LEVEL IN AFRICA
by reaffirming that “U.S. AFRICOM will
sustain the activities that the three commands
and our African friends are already
conducting together.”102
However, a top priority for AFRICOM
should be to enhance U.S. peacekeeping
capacity-building programs. The demand for
African peacekeepers far outstrips the supply
of adequately trained and equipped forces,
capable of sustaining themselves for lengthy
periods while deployed on UN and AU
operations, and AFRICOM is well-suited to
address this. According to U.S. Ambassador
to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad:
“The United States is committed to helping
African states increase their capacity.
Since 2005, the United States has trained
over 34,000 African peacekeepers from 19
countries and has provided $375 million
to increase global capacity for peacekeeping
operations in Africa and elsewhere.
Additionally, we see an opportunity for
several African countries to increase their
capacity for combined and joint operations
by stressing interoperability in equipment,
training, and communications and building
professional relationships among officers
of all African nations. Steps such as
these will enhance overall AU peacekeeping
capacity and will be a focus for the new
U.S.-African command (AFRICOM).”103
The numbers look impressive at first blush
– but years of U.S. assistance to Africa
through ACRI, ACOTA and GPOI have not
produced a viable and credible independent
African peace operations capability.
Rather, these programs bring home the fact
that real capacity building is not a simple
“train and equip” quick fix. Africa needs a
demonstrable commitment by AFRICOM
to provide long-term, sustainable support to
developing African peacekeeping capabilities
for participating in UN peacekeeping, as well
as African Union and regional operations.
AFRICOM holds the promise of joining
up current U.S. military capacity-building
programs such as GPOI, ACOTA, and IMET
and of evaluating and updating such programs
to ensure their relevance, coherence
and effectiveness in enhancing the quality
and quantity of African troops who are readily
available for peace operations.
There are, however, a number of very real and
practical challenges regarding AFRICOM’s
ability to deliver on the non-counter-terrorism
part of its mission, and to add the necessary
value to existing U.S. capacity-building programs
that General Ward has been promising.
Capacity-building is a long-term, relationship-
based activity, rather than simply a
menu of trainings or skill-sets to be delivered.
Human resources development is central
to any capacity building process. Expert-led
practices have to be replaced by local training,
education and technical transfer of know-how,
for the aim of capacity building is to nurture
local ownership and to develop local competences
in order to break out of a vicious circle
of dependency. In practice, however, interveners
inevitably attempt to transplant their own
national systems, procedures and values to
host-nation institutions. Failure occurs when
the specificities of the recipient country are
either not correctly addressed, or ignored, resulting
in a bad copy of the initial model and,
in the long run, to its abandonment because
of its lack of effectiveness.
The problem for AFRICOM is that U.S.
forces have no recent experience as UN
peacekeepers. Moreover, while U.S. forces
have deployed to Africa and worked with
African militaries in different contexts over
the years, the U.S. military has less exposure
to and knowledge of Africa than many other
foreign militaries. Ex-colonial powers such
as France and the United Kingdom have
more military experience in Africa, both
combat and peacetime, than does the United
States. AFRICOM therefore lacks the depth
of historical knowledge, cultural references
and local connections regional commands
enjoy in other theaters of operation.
Part of the delivery challenge will lie in
the time it takes to build AFRICOM’s staff
A top priority for
AFRICOM should
be to enhance
U.S. peacekeeping
capacity-building
programs.
www.refugesinternational .org 36
capacity, to build true African knowledge
within the Command, and to forge lasting
and meaningful relationships with African
counterparts. This will take a good deal
of time, and require sufficient dedicated
financial and human resources to prove
to Africans that the U.S. is serious about
AFRICOM’s capacity-building mandate.
However, it is unclear at this point where
these resources will come from.
Resource Issues
While the President’s budget provided funds
to establish AFRICOM’s interim headquarters
in Stuttgart, Germany,104 funds are not
currently allocated to allow AFRICOM to
play a more effective role as a security sector
and governance capacity-building vehicle
for African nations. General Ward has told
the House Armed Services Committee that
“…building regional stability and security
will take many years of sustained and dedicated
effort. There is no conspicuous finish
line. Therefore, enduring Congressional
support is indispensable.”105 However, the
focus of General Ward’s pitch, like that of
Secretaries Gates and Rice to the same committee
a month later, was on entrenching
and expanding Section 1206 authority, and
was motivated with reference to the GWOT.
Ward asked Congress specifically to:
“Provide budgetary flexibility to Combatant
Commanders and Ambassadors,
including making Section 1206 Global
Train and Equip authority permanent and
expanding it to meet the demand State
and DOD have seen over the past three
years ... This authority is a vital element of
the GWOT.”106
General Ward made no mention of Title 22
of the U.S. Code, which gives the Department
of State authority for important tools
for supporting military professionalism and
security sector reform – like the International
Military Education and Training
(IMET) program, Foreign Military Financing
(FMF), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).
AFRICOM’s potential share of an expanded
Section 1206 allocation would be insufficient
for the Command to successfully accomplish
its full range of missions, especially SSR and
the building of real and sustainable African
peacekeeping capacity. Security-related programs
in Africa currently receive only about
$250 million a year. This level of funding
is woefully inadequate. While security is a
prerequisite for development, U.S. security
assistance to Africa remains ineffective. It
is both under funded and skewed towards
perceived partners in the war on terrorism.
Africa’s principal security challenge is to
mobilize sufficient resources to provide a
secure, stable, and well-governed environment
characterized by the Rule of Law, in
which human rights and civil liberties are
protected and promoted, and where business
can thrive. All African countries face a capacity
deficit in their institutions of state, and
the state is too often a predator rather than a
facilitator. Since the 1960s, African armies
have exhibited a tendency towards rapacious
behavior, and the rebellions spawned in response
have caused unimaginable suffering
for civilians. To support defense sector transformation
in a manner that can be sustained
over a long period, AFRICOM will need
additional resources, as well as expertise. For
example, only two officials in USAID have
any knowledge of SSR or Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
programming.
In the realm of defense sector reform, the
importance of sustained external mentoring
and commitment is well recognized and
cannot be over-emphasized. The usefulness
of a lead-nation rather than multinational
approach has been demonstrated by the
UK in Sierra Leone, as has the allocation
of sufficient financial resources to do the
job properly. On the other hand, there are
many examples of perverse consequences of
short-term U.S. assistance to select African
armies. AFRICOM should therefore demonstrate
that it understands the role of military
support within the broader sphere of Security
Sector Reform (which includes the police
Funds are not
currently allocated
to allow AFRICOM to
play a more effective
role as a security
sector and governance
capacitybuilding
vehicle for
African nations.
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL 37 LEVEL IN AFRICA
and intelligence agencies as well as the
judicial sector), that it is willing to provide
sustained support to defense transformation
in partner countries, and that it will have a
secure funding mechanism to do so.
AFRICOM’s current meager DOS budget
for bilateral security cooperation falls far
short of what is required if AFRICOM is to
have true credibility and impact. Without
sufficient authority and resources for AFRICOM,
it may well be “business as usual”
in Africa. Because of the length of budget
cycles, competing priorities, emerging
crises, and its perceived lack of importance
compared to other regions, Africa usually
gets short changed. Absent the creation of a
mechanism such as the UK Africa Conflict
Prevention Pool, increases in foreign military
financing (FMF), international military
education and training (IMET), and a substantial
increase in peacekeeping operations
(PKO) funding should be used to support
AFRICOM engagement initiatives. At the
same time, the State Department’s Africa
Bureau will need an increase in personnel to
facilitate coordination with AFRICOM and
to ensure faster processing of program and
spending proposals.
Such resource increases should help to address
the conspicuous imbalance that now
exists between the modest amounts currently
allocated to actual programmatic activities
in Africa and the much larger cost projections
for the establishment and operation
of AFRICOM. Unless substantial programs
exist to justify AFRICOM’s overhead costs,
hard questions are likely to arise about the
gap between AFRICOM’s posture of “Active
Security” and the actual enhancement
of African security through the delivery of
assistance programs that are appropriate,
meaningful and sustainable.
Potential for a Cohesive Approach to Africa
The establishment of AFRICOM and the
transfer of geographical responsibility for
Africa from EUCOM, CENTCOM, and
PACOM hold great promise for a more
cohesive approach to U.S. military engagement
with the continent. Instead of having
three commanders that deal with Africa as a
third or fourth priority, there is now a single
four-star general who deals with the continent
as his first and only priority. The new
command should therefore be welcomed by
Africans. Informed, consistent and coherent
engagement is far better than ad hoc U.S.
military engagement or retrenchment in Africa.
However, this simple benefit has been
overshadowed by U.S. public diplomacy that
emphasizes the “soft” side of AFRICOM’s
mandate, at the same time as the U.S.
military continues with short-term kinetic
operations, such as air strikes, in support of
the GWOT.
Elements of the global jihadi insurgency
are no doubt present in several African
regions, and AFRICOM rightly considers
the neutralization of these elements one of
its primary goals. However, this objective
would be more consonant with broader U.S.
goals in Africa and the proclaimed concept
of ‘active security’ if it were accomplished
through partnering with African nations in
areas such as intelligence sharing, law enforcement,
and military cooperation, as well
as through longer-term civilian-led efforts to
reduce poverty, promote development under
the rule of law, and improve governance.
If AFRICOM continues to be justified to
Congress primarily in terms of the GWOT,
and if the U.S. military continues to conduct
sporadic but dramatic military strikes on
individuals suspected of terrorism – while
attempting to embed AFRICOM in a larger
construct of humanitarianism and capacity
building – African and domestic humanitarian
opposition to the command is bound to
grow stronger.
AFRICOM’s legitimacy on the continent will
be largely determined by its ability to work
in collaboration with and close support of
the African Union, as well as with United
Nations operations in Africa. Although
African security needs are well defined and
articulated in the various conflict manage-
Informed, consistent
and coherent
engagement is far
better than ad hoc
U.S. military
engagement or
retrenchment
in Africa.
www.refugesinternational .org 38
ment protocols of the African Union and
the Regional Economic Communities, these
have hitherto not been well known by U.S.
military staff. Indeed there has been a general
and serious dearth of knowledge about
the African continent among DOD officers,
and AFRICOM presents the opportunity to
develop a stable cadre of African area specialists,
officers who know Africa and how to
interact constructively with Africans. Part of
the delivery challenge will therefore lie in the
time it takes to build true African knowledge
within the Command, and to forge lasting
and meaningful relationships with African
counterparts.
The African Union is increasingly working
in close cooperation and often in tandem
with the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations. With the United Nations present
in virtually every corner of Africa, often in
a peacebuilding or peacekeeping capacity,
AFRICOM will not be able to operate for
long without intersecting in some way with
UN activities. To the extent that AFRICOM
is perceived as supportive of UN security
and peacekeeping missions, international
acceptance of AFRICOM will grow. Conversely,
few things are as likely to undermine
AFRICOM’s effectiveness or its welcome
in Africa as a perception that AFRICOM is
working at cross-purposes with the United
Nations.107
If AFRICOM is to overcome the legacy of
nearly a year of negative hype and African
opposition, and attract U.S. budgetary support,
then much detail needs to be added to a
new strategy, one backed by substance rather
than rhetoric. Talk of “value added” is necessary
but insufficient. General Ward and his
AFRICOM staff need to communicate a plan
that provides evidence of a deep understanding
of the African peace and security architecture
and illustrates in some detail exactly
how the U.S. intends to support this through
a variety of capacity-building programs that
are coordinated and integrated, both within
the U.S. Government and among Africa’s
other international partners. And the State
Department and USAID need the capacity
and the will to engage robustly with their
DOD counterparts in AFRICOM in the development
and execution of this plan.
In order to be effective in a capacity-building
role, AFRICOM will need access to a
predictable and substantial enough source of
funding to allow for engagement in the kind
of long-term interagency programming that
may actually deliver meaningful results. 108
However, any increased funding that may accrue
to the Command through DOD should
be over-matched by the funding of State
Department funding for Africa programs. As
Senator Feingold warned last year,
“…We need to ensure that [AFRICOM] will
contribute to, not define, the U.S. Government’s
overall strategy and objectives
for the continent. We also need to make
sure that the U.S. military’s activities
and involvement on the continent do not
overshadow, skew, or otherwise hinder our
Government’s other key objectives.… We
need to look at an equally aggressive plan
to strengthen our diplomatic, development,
humanitarian, and human rights
work throughout the continent. This may
include addressing how the Congress allocates
funds—both to this new command
and to the other departments and agencies
that will make the spirit and intent of this
command work.”109
If AFRICOM is to
overcome the legacy
of nearly a year of
negative hype and
African opposition…
then much detail
needs to be added to
a new strategy.
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL 39 LEVEL IN AFRICA
CONCLUS ION
The erosion of civilian capacity and the
accompanying reliance on military power
have significant consequences for the U.S.
and the world. Military and other security
concerns have effectively reshaped U.S.
international priorities such that global
engagement is often determined by the
military’s capabilities and requirements.
Issues that lack a security dimension for
the U.S. have been relegated to a much
lower priority, if they are addressed at all.
Moreover, since 2001, the United States has
pursued an increasingly unilateral posture in
the pursuit of national security and foreign
and development policy. American policy
places little emphasis on the need to harmonize
U.S. approaches with those of the UN
and other donors, or indeed to align these
policies with the priorities of local actors.
The U.S. ties more aid than any other donor
to the purchase of its own goods, it relies far
more heavily on contractors for delivery, and
it spends more on international technical assistance
than any other donor, with the bulk
of that money going to U.S. consultants.
The U.S. military is moving rapidly to fill
the vacuum created by shrinking civilian
capacity, in pursuit of short-term solutions
to stabilization problems that do not address
the vexing and enduring challenges facing
the world’s billion most impoverished
people. The desire of the Department of Defense
for a “unity of effort” that uses all U.S.
government agencies as “force multipliers”
in the war on terror is changing the ethos
and manner in which weakened civilian
agencies operate. The resultant militarization
of aid in an effort to prevail in the war
against terrorism and in pursuit of national
security objectives is unlikely to enhance
either national security or the ability of the
U.S. to achieve its foreign policy goals. The
history of counter-insurgency, as well as development
theory and practice, points rather
towards long-term failure.
Despite all the talk of “Smart Power,” it is
clear that the U.S. has not been very smart in
its “3D” approach to bolstering weak, fragile,
failing or failed states. While the gains of
targeted aid harnessed in pursuit of the fight
against terrorism remain dubious at best,
the U.S. has no coherent long-term foreign
assistance strategy in the fight against global
poverty. There is clearly an urgent need to
modernize the U.S. aid infrastructure and
for elevating development on a par with diplomacy
and defense. Beyond better targeted
and delivered development assistance, the
United States could clearly wield far greater
influence per aid dollar spent by deploying
its influence in trade, investment, debt, and
financial policies in a deliberate manner
towards achieving coherent rather than conflicting
objectives abroad. For example, in
the realm of agriculture, U.S. development
and trade policies frequently work at cross
purposes.
While the current administration is promoting
a range of initiatives to redress the
imbalance in U.S. instruments for global
engagement, these efforts do not go far
enough. They are aimed at a “quick fix” for
long-broken machinery, with the objective of
getting the machinery running quickly and
smoothly enough for all parts to engage in
the overarching U.S. foreign policy objective
– victory in the GWOT. Reform efforts point
in the direction of further militarization of
foreign policy, with the DOD championing
the cause for increased funding for State and
AID, and the State Department reciprocating
all too willingly in the name of interagency
cooperation and unity of effort in pursuit of
‘transformational diplomacy.’
In both aid and diplomacy, a new U.S. commitment
to multilateral global engagement
– especially through the UN and its various
departments and agencies – would lend credence
to the notion that both development
and the war against terrorism are global
challenges, and that America can work
with a variety of allies to achieve its foreign
policy objectives. Where the UN intervenes
in a peacekeeping role, it is time to think
of the success or failure of such operations
There is clearly
an urgent need to
modernize the U.S.
aid infrastructure
and for elevating
development on a
par with diplomacy
and defense.
www.refugesinternational .org 40
also as U.S. successes or failures. With the
U.S. playing a dominant role in the Security
Council and paying more than a quarter of
the peacekeeping bill, this approach would
be based as much on common sense as a
new spirit of internationalism.
The war in Iraq is hopefully the high water
mark of post 9/11 U.S. unilateralism in
issues of international peace and security.
As the presidential candidates campaign on
the promise of change in Washington DC,
and at least two on the promise of drawing
down U.S. forces in Iraq, attention must
shift to post-Iraq policy, to a post-Iraq “peace
dividend” and a commitment to use a good
portion of this to substantially increase U.S.
capacity for diplomacy and development.
The development and effective implementation
of a comprehensive new global
engagement strategy will require bipartisan
political consensus. It will require more than
piecemeal adoption by various agencies and
departments. It will ultimately depend upon
strong presidential leadership, and regular,
constructive consultation with Congress, in
order to garner popular support and to reconcile
competing bureaucratic interests.
Building bipartisan consensus to reinvent
the way America engages with the rest of
the world will not be easy. A single “success
demonstrator” may well be the key to
advancing the process. Africa is a relatively
low-cost investment for the U.S. and reinventing
Africa policy should not place undue
demands on other budgetary priorities.
Doing a few things well in Africa, and doing
the right thing in Africa, can have a positive
impact on 53 UN member states, help uplift
80% of the world’s poorest people, and win
friends and influence in the most under-governed
continent in the world. In other words,
if the establishment of AFRICOM, the
strengthening of the State Department’s Africa
Bureau and USAID programs in Africa
can be seen to produce really positive results,
the effort could serve as a pilot project for
the grander scheme of global engagement.
RECOMEND ATIONS
• The President, working with Congress,
must strengthen U.S. civilian professional
capacity to carry out diplomatic and
development operations to improve efforts
to build stable, prosperous democracies.
Benchmarks should be set for allocating
funding to address the current 17 to 1
spending imbalance in staffing and
resources between defense and diplomatic/
development operations, and for
rolling back the over-reliance on contractors
to deliver on foreign assistance
programs.
• The next President should conduct a
thorough assessment of both civilian
and military capacities to advance national
goals as a step toward modernizing the
National Security Act and the Foreign
Assistance Act.
• The President and Congress should
mandate a thorough review of U.S. Africa
policy and then provide sufficient funding
and manpower resources to the Department
of State to strengthen its Africa
bureau to engage regionally as well as
bilaterally in Africa; to provide direction
for civilian capacity building programs in
the governance and security sectors; and
to support African peacekeeping operations
and regional conflict management
mechanisms.
• Beyond counter-terrorism efforts, AFRICOM
should focus on two roles to strengthen
peace and security in Africa, namely
a) assisting African countries with
defense sector reform; and b) supporting
Africa’s regional organizations in building
conflict management and standby force
capacity. These roles will require both
State Department and DOD involvement
and collaboration.
• Until a review of civilian and military
capacities is conducted and an overall
foreign aid strategy is developed, the
Congress should defer the permanent
The next president
should conduct a
thorough assessment
of both civilian and
military capacities
to achieve developmental
goals.
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL 41 LEVEL IN AFRICA
authorization of and the requested
substantial increase in funding (from
$300 to $750 million) for the Department
of Defense Section 1206 train or equip
program, to ensure full Congressional
oversight and compliance with the Foreign
Assistance Act’s provisions on aid to
repressive governments.
• The Department of Defense should
develop, in concert with State and AID, a
draft strategy paper that explains exactly
how AFRICOM’s role in security sector
reform supports the U.S. development
and good governance goals. With a clearly
articulated strategy, AFRICOM will be better
positioned to convince Congress that
a consistent level of funding dedicated to
Africa is needed to permit the U.S. to take
a longer-term view on development needs,
holistic security sector reform, sustained
engagement with partner nations, and in
building peace and security capacity more
effectively.
• AFRICOM’s planning should take into
account the African Union’s detailed plans
for the establishment of an African Standby
Force (ASF) by 2010. The Command’s
plans should incorporate some of the
detail of the African Union’s ASF Policy
Framework Document and its Roadmap
for Implementation.
• The President and the Congress should
provide funding and support for security
sector reform and AFRICOM’s mission
should prioritize those processes and programs
that have been clearly identified by
the UN Secretary-General as an essential
prerequisite for successful war to peace
transitions and to permit the drawdown
and ultimate withdrawal of expensive
peace operations in Africa.
• Coordinating security sector and peacekeeping
assistance should be a priority in
AFRICOM’s mandate. A lack of coordinated
international donor support for
SSR in the DRC threatens that country’s
peace process. Moreover, the AU and the
sub-regional organizations in Africa lack
the capacity to analyze and absorb the
plethora of uncoordinated assistance initiatives
emanating from various coalitions
of donor countries. AFRICOM would be
uniquely poised to act as a focal point for
liaison and coordination between African
countries and organizations and their
multiple peacekeeping and security
capacity-building ‘partners’.
• AFRICOM should create, as a matter of
urgency, a core of civil-military expertise
within the Command staff for constructive
engagement with and support to UN
peace operations in Africa – particularly
in those dimensions of operations where
expertise and resources are sadly lacking
yet absolutely essential for stabilization
and reconstruction – like DDR and Rule
of Law.
• The Administration should work with
Congress to create a transparent, interagency
budget-building process for
AFRICOM to allocate the money to implement
a comprehensive U.S. military and
political strategy in Africa. This process
should involve the Department of State
and the Country Teams, USAID, the
Commander AFRICOM, the Joint Staff,
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
AFRICOM should
create… a core
of civil-military
expertise within
the Command staff
for constructive
engagement with
and support to UN
peace operations
in Africa.
www.refugesinternational .org 42
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ACOTA Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ACRI African Crisis Response Initiative
AFL Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRICOM U.S. Africa Command
APS Africa Partnership Station
ASF African Standby Force
BTU Brigade Training Unit
CBR Centres de Brassage
CENTCOM U.S. Central Command
CJTF-HOA Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFID UK Department for International Development
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
ESF ECOWAS Standby Force
EUCOM U.S. European Command
EUSEC European Union Security Sector Reform Mission
EUSEC FIN European Union Security Financial Mission
FARDC Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
(Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
FDLR Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda
(Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda)
FMF Foreign Military Financing
GPOI Global Peace Operations Initiative
GRC Governance Reform Commission
GWOT Global War on Terror
IET Initial Entry Training
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL 43 LEVEL IN AFRICA
IGP Inspector General of Police
IMET International Military Education and Training
IPRS Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy
JPB Joint Personnel Board
LNP Liberia National Police
MCC Millennium Challenge Corporation
MONUC Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo
(UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDAA National Defense Authorization Act
NSPD National Security Presidential Directive
ODA Official Development Assistance
ODC Office of Defense Cooperation
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PACOM U.S. Pacific Command
PAE Pacific Architects and Engineers
PEPFAR President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PKO Peacekeeping Operations
PMI President’s Malaria Initiative
PNC Congolese National Police
QRU Quick Response Unit
SSR Security Sector Reform
SSTR Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
TSCTP Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Partnership
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
WHO World Health Organization
www.refugesinternational .org 44
Endnotes
1 British attention to fragile states actually
antedates 9/11 and the “global war on terrorism.”
It originated in experiences in Sierra
Leone and other African countries during the
1990s, which persuaded the UK Department
for International Development (DFID), in particular,
that violent conflict posed a significant
obstacle to development. DFID’s White Paper
of 2000, Eliminating World Poverty: Making
Globalization Work for the Poor, made this connection
explicit, identifying personal security as
prerequisite for sustainable livelihoods.
2 Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater than
the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government”
Approaches to Fragile States, International
Peace Academy, New York, 2007, p 1.
3 Source: Congressional Budget Office for
FY2008.
4 Source: The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 2007, London,
IISS, 2007, p 28.
5 Bill Rigby, “Defense stocks may jump higher
with big profits,” Reuters, April 12, 2006.
6 The Washington Post, 5 December 2006.
7 Patrick and Brown, op cit, p 54.
8 Ibid, p 35.
9 Statement of General William E. Ward, USA,
Commander, United States Africa Command,
before the House Armed Services Committee
on 13 March 2008, p 3.
10 Robert D. Kaplan, The Next Frontier, The Atlantic,
1 November 2007.
11 SIPRI Yearbook, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, 2007.
12 William D. Hartung, Bush Military Budget Highest
Since WW II, Common Dreams, 10 February
2007. http://www.commondreams.org/
views07/0210-26.htm
13 Ibid.
14 David Roodman, An Index of Donor Performance,
Center for Global Development, April 2004.
http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/
_active/cdi/
15 Real Aid: Making Technical Assistance Work,
Action Aid, 5 July 2006, pp 5-6.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid, p 24.
18 Robert M. Gates, Testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee, 15 April 2008, op cit.
19 Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance
within the Department of State (State/F). The
Director of this Office – the Director of U.S.
Foreign Assistance (DFA) – serves concurrently
as the USAID Administrator and has authority
over all USAID and Department of State foreign
assistance funding and programs.
20 Paying the price: Why rich countries must invest
now in a war on poverty, Oxfam International,
Oxford, 2005.
21 The U.S. channels about 12% of its funding
through local procurement systems (against an
international average of 38 %) and 10 % of its
funding through the public finance management
systems, such as budget execution,
financial reporting, and auditing of recipient
countries, compared with 75 percent for the UK
and an average across all major donors of 33%.
OECD 2006 donor survey overview, OECD, Paris,
2007, p 82.
22 For example, the HELP Commission, the 2006
Task Force on Transforming Foreign Assistance
for the 21st Century, the 2007 Smart Power
Commission, and the 2004 Commission on
Weak States.
23 Patrick and Brown, op cit, p. 10.
24 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-
44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning
Reconstruction and Stabilization, December 7,
2005. Archived at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/
nspd/nspd- 44.html.
25 Ibid.
26 Robert M. Gates, “Landon Lecture (Kansas
State University),” 26 November 2007.
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.
aspx?speechid=1199.
27 Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, Report
to Congress on the Implementation of DOD
Directive 3000.05 Military Support for Stability,
Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR)
Operations, Washington DC, 1 April, 2007, p 1.
Own emphasis added to tasks that are patently
civilian in nature.
28 Ibid, p 2.
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL 45 LEVEL IN AFRICA
29 According to USAID, the characteristics that
differentiate TSCTP activities from traditional
development are targeting and timeframe.
Remote at-risk geographic regions and at-risk
populations are targeted based on vulnerability
to influence by extremists. This targeting can
come from a variety of sources. The development
portion of the TSCTP will be implemented
in an abbreviated timeframe because the
program needs to keep pace with DOD and DOS
interventions. USAID, Request for Task Order
Proposals (RTOP), “Peace Through Development”,
2007, p.4
30 Correspondence from James Bishop, Vice President,
Humanitarian Policy & Practice, InterAcrion,
18 April 2008.
31 Section 1206 authority initially provided funds
to the Pentagon to train and equip military and
police forces in Iraq and Afghanistan without
State Department involvement. It was later
broadened to allow for paying the costs, with
State Department concurrence, of training and
equipping other countries, including Algeria,
Chad, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Lebanon,
Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Senegal,
Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, and Yemen. In
FY2006, DOD and State jointly approved 8
programs in 11 countries totaling approximately
$100M. In 2007, 39 programs were approved in
47 countries, at a total cost of $280M.
32 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) gives
the Department of State primacy over how and
when to provide military assistance to foreign
governments. Over the last 46 years, Congress
has added conditions to the FAA that require the
State Department to consider the recipient state’s
record on human rights and democracy, before
disbursing military aid. Congress deliberately
placed the responsibility for providing military
assistance with the State Department in order to
ensure that assistance is granted in accordance
with long-term U.S. foreign policy goals.
33 Robert M. Gates, Testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee, 15 April 2008, op cit.
34 Ibid.
35 U.S. Government, National Strategy for Countering
Terrorism, September 2006, p 16.
36 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Testimony
before the House Armed Services Committee
hearing on “Building Partnership Capacity and
the Development of the Interagency Process,”
15 April 2008.
37 This will be the first time in 12 years that USAID
will hire above its attrition rate. USAID had as
many officials deployed in Vietnam in 1969 as it
does worldwide today.
38 Robert M. Gates, Testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee, 15 April 2008,
op cit.
39 War by Other Means: Building Complete and
Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency,
RAND Corporation, February 2008.
40 See, for example: Jim Thomas, Sustainable Security:
Developing a Security Strategy for the Long
Haul, Center for New American Security, April
2008. http://www.cnas.org/en/cms/?1924.
41 Leo Hindery Jr., Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Gayle
Smith, “Appendix 11: Additional views by
commissioners,” in Beyond Assistance: The HELP
Commission report on foreign assistance reform,
US Commission on Helping to Enhance the
Livelihood of People Around the Globe, 2007.
42 U.S. Government, Summary and Highlights –
International Affairs Function 150, Fiscal Year
2009 Budget Request, p 44.
43 A 2005 RAND Corporation study found that
UN-led nation-building efforts are more successful
— and cheaper — than comparative
American-led efforts. Since the start of the
US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the UN
has quietly assumed responsibility for managing
a growing number of conflicts, not only
in Africa, but worldwide. The flare-up in Haiti
in 2004 and the July 2006 fighting between
Israel and Hezbollah, for example, were both
mitigated by sending UN peacekeepers, very
few of whom were from the United States. Of
the over 90,000 UN troops and police that were
deployed to 20 missions worldwide, only 293
were American.
44 Mark Bellamy, Kathleen Hicks, and J. Stephen
Morrison, Strengthening AFRICOM’s Case, 5
March 2008. http://www.csis.org/component/
option,com_csis_progj/task,view/id,1160/
45 The AC-130 is basically a Hercules C-130
transport plane fitted with an awesome array
of armament – ranging from 20mm Vulcan
cannons and 40mm Bofors cannons to 105 mm
howitzers and a 25 mm Gatling gun that can fire
1,800 rounds per minute. The firepower of the
AC-130 is devastating.
www.refugesinternational .org 46
46 The Tomahawk is a long-range subsonic cruise
missile for attacking land targets. It is approximately
20 feet long, and weighs around 3,000
pounds. Each Tomahawk costs around US$
one million, and can be fitted with a warhead
containing 1,000 pounds of conventional explosives
— or a nuclear warhead equivalent to 20
thousand tons of conventional explosives.
47 U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget
Request, op cit, p 45.
48 The FY 09 PKO request reflects ongoing funding
requirements for GPOI, TSCTP, a new counterterrorism
program (EARSI) in East Africa, and
multi-lateral peacekeeping and regional stability
operations, as well as security sector reform
programs in Somalia.
49 U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget
Request, op cit, p 45.
50 Ibid, p 46.
51 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations:
Principles and Guidelines. (Capstone Doctrine
Draft 3), UN DPKO, 29 June 2007, par 54.
52 Government of Liberia, An Act to establish the
National Security Council of the Republic of
Liberia, 12 March 1999.
53 Article VII Sections 1(b), 2 (a – d) and 3 of the
CPA, 2003, pp 15-16.
54 United Nations Security Council, Resolution
1509 (2003), S/RES/1509 (2003), 19 September
2003, p 4.
55 Article XXXV, Section 1(e) of the CPA states that:
“All suspended provisions of the Constitution,
Statutes and other laws of Liberia, affected as
a result of this Agreement, shall be deemed to
be restored with the inauguration of the elected
Government by January 2006…”
56 Articles 51 and 54 (e) of the Constitution of the
Republic of Liberia, 1986.
57 However, a meaningful, long-term process of
security sector reform must consider the extent
to which the constitution too must be reformed.
The issue of overlapping responsibilities of security
institutions highlights the need to provide
constitutional backing and clarification for all
statutory security institutions. Moreover, the
present Constitution encourages abuse of power,
especially by the President, who appoints virtually
all the leaders of these security apparatus.
58 Liberia: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper, IMF Country Report No. 07/60, February
2007, p 32. http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
scr/2007/cr0760.pdf
59 Amos Sawyer was the President of the Interim
Government of National Unity in Liberia from
22 November 1990 to 2 March 1994. He left
Liberia in 2001, after the militiamen of President
Taylor attempted to murder him and his
colleague, Conmany Wesseh of the Center for
Democratic Empowerment.
60 Dr. Amos Sawyer, Chairman of the Liberia Governance
Reform Commission, Monrovia, 21 August
2007.
61 Thomas A. Dempsey, Security Sector Reform in
Liberia: Restructuring the Ministry of National
Defense, unpublished information paper, 17
June 2007. Thomas Dempsey, a retired U.S.
Army colonel, served on the SSR Program team
as Director of Ministry of Defense Reform and
Training.
62 Amos Sawyer, op cit.
63 Ibid.
64 The national budget for 2006 was a paltry $123
million; for 2007 it was $199 million. Even if
Liberia were to attain and sustain an economic
growth rate of 10% per annum, the baseline is
so low that it would take 25 years for the Liberian
economy to return to the level it was at in
the 1980s.
65 RAND Report, op cit, pp 26-28.
66 Ibid, pp 25-26.
67 Sean McFate, The Art and Aggravation of Vetting
in Post-Conflict Environments, Military
Review, July-August 2007, p 82.
68 Ibid, p 82.
69 At present, no single ethnic group makes up
more than 15% of the AFL.
70 Sergeant Major Spike Roberts (USMC retired),
Director of Training, Camp Ware, Monrovia, 30
August 2007.
71 Briefing by Lieutenant Colonel William Wyatt,
Monrovia, 28 August 2007.
U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL 47 LEVEL IN AFRICA
72 The Government of Liberia (Ministry of Defense)
is responsible for paying the monthly salary of all
members of the AFL, according to agreed salary
scales ranging from US$90 for a private to $170
for a Sergeant-Major. This compares well to the
basic monthly salary for the civil servants, which
is $50 per month. Interestingly, all members of
the Band are paid at a rate of $140 per month,
regardless of rank. Recruits undergoing basic
training receive a salary of $40, until such time as
they graduate as riflemen.
73 For example, the UK has offered to train company
grade officers and has seconded an advisor (a
lieutenant colonel) to the program. This officer
is currently assisting the Ministry of Defense.
William M. Wyatt, op cit.
74 Ibid.
75 Telephone interview with Andy Michels, former
head of DynCorp’s Security Reform team in
Liberia, 7 August 2007.
76 DynCorp took up assignment in Liberia in August
2005. According to DynCorp, delays in the
start of the program were predicated by certain
actions of the national government, including
the slow pace of voluntary relocation of civilians
living in Camp Scheifflin.
77 DynCorp took up assignment in Liberia in
August 2005.
78 William M. Wyatt, op cit.
79 According to Lieutenant Colonel Wyatt: “The
AFL is not replacing UNMIL. That is the job
of the police. The AFL can assume the UNMIL
border responsibilities, but that does not entail
15,000 peacekeepers.” Similarly, Jacques Klein,
the former UN Secretary General’s Special
Representative in Liberia, suggested shortly after
taking up his post that Liberia should abolish
its army altogether, and that Liberia could make
do with a decent police force and a well-trained
border security force of 600 to 700 men.
80 According to the latest UN assessment, the pace
of the drawdown process should be linked to the
following core benchmarks: (a) completion of
the basic training of 3,500 personnel of the Liberian
National Police by July 2007; (b) completion
of police operating procedures by December
2008; (c) completion of the formation of the
500-strong Police Quick Reaction Unit by July
2009; (d) equipping of police personnel and
their deployment to the counties, as well as
building of police infrastructure by December
2010; (e) finalization of the national security
strategy and architecture and their implementation
throughout the country by December 2008;
and (f) training and operationalization of the
first and second Armed Forces of Liberia battalions
by September 2008 and September 2009,
respectively. UN Security Council, Fifteenth
progress report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/2007/479,
8 August 2007.
81 For example, there are controversies around
DynCorp flying missions to eradicate coca fields
in Colombia. However, the company really
shook the peacekeeping community in 2001,
when Kathryn Bolkovac, a UN Police Officer,
filed a lawsuit in Britain against DynCorp for
firing her after she reported that DynCorp police
trainers in Bosnia were paying for prostitutes
and participating in sex trafficking. Many of
the DynCorp employees were forced to resign
under suspicion of illegal activity. None were
prosecuted, since they enjoyed immunity from
prosecution in Bosnia.
82 Ezekiel Pajibo and Emira Woods, AFRICOM:
Wrong for Liberia, Disastrous for Africa, Foreign
Policy in Focus, 26 July 2007. http://fpif.org/
fpiftxt/4427
83 Amos Sawyer, op cit.
84 Ibid.
85 The elections were a huge logistical accomplishment.
MONUC facilitated the registration of
some 25 million people throughout the country,
as well as the road, air and river transport of
ballots. The first and second round of Presidential
elections were held on 30 July and 19
October 2006; National Assembly elections on
30 July 2006; Provincial Assembly elections on
19 October 2006; Indirect Senatorial elections
on 19 January 2007; and Indirect Gubernatorial
elections (27 January 2007).
86 Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of
Congo, the name used for the Congolese national
army since the beginning of the transition.
87 U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget
Request, op cit, p 46.
88 International training support was provided to
the FARDC in the CBRs as follows: Belgium
– Kisangani; Angola – Kitona; Belgium and
South Africa – Kamina; Netherlands and South
Africa – Nyaleke; Netherlands and South Africa
- Mushake (Rumangabo); and the EU – Luberizi.
89 Lt. Gen. Babacar Gaye, Force Commander’s
Directive 01/07 on Protection of Civilians in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUC OpsSp
01/07, 10 March 2007.
www.refugesinternational .org 48
90 Hans Hoebke, Stephanie Carette and Koen
Vlassenroot, EU Support to the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Brussels, IRRI-KIIB, 2006.
91 There is no system in place for validating the total
number of personnel serving in the FARDC.
92 France, the UK, and the USA – plus Angola and
South Africa.
93 U.S. security interests on the African continent
have hitherto been overseen by three different
combatant commanders: the commander of the
European Command, based in Stuttgart, Germany,
has been responsible for North Africa and
much of sub-Saharan Africa; the commander of
Central Command, located in Tampa, Florida,
with primary responsibility for the Middle East
has had oversight over the Horn of Africa; and
the commander of Pacific Command, located in
Honolulu, Hawaii has been responsible for the
islands off the west coast of Africa.
94 Nigeria; Country, Gulf of Guinea and
AFRICOM, Africa News 22 November 2007.
95 Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, State Department
Foreign Press Center Briefing, June 22,
2007. http://www.eucom.mil/africom/transcript221110Ljun2007.
asp
96 Statement of General William E. Ward, USA,
Commander, United States Africa Command,
before the House Armed Services Committee on
13 March 2008, pp 8-9.
97 Ibid, pp.7-8. Emphasis added.
98 CENTCOM established CJTF-HOA in late 2002
to disrupt the flow of jihadis from the Middle
East to East Africa in the wake of the invasion
of Afghanistan. It soon became clear, however,
that the region encompassing the African states
of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia,
and Sudan contained less of an al-Qaeda presence
than once feared. CENTCOM therefore
amended CJTF-HOA’s mandate. The Task
Force based at Djibouti’s Camp Lemonier soon
took on an increasing number of quick impact
projects aimed at “winning hearts and minds”
and thought to be addressing the root causes
that “breed jihadis”. See Robert G. Berschinski,
AFRICOM’s Dilemma: The “Global War on Terrorism,”
“Capacity Building,” Humanitarianism,
and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa,
SSI Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute,
November 2007. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.
army.mil/pdffiles/PUB827.pdf
99 Daniel Volman, AFRICOM: The new United
States military command for Africa, http://www.
africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=16418
100 The CJTF-HOA provided intelligence to Ethiopia
in support of its invasion of Somalia in January
2007 and used military facilities in Djibouti,
Ethiopia, and Kenya to launch its own attacks
against alleged al-Qaeda members involved in
the Council of Islamic Courts in Somalia in
January and June of 2007.
101 Donna Miles, Navy Mission to Set Tone for U.S.
Africa Command—USS Fort McHenry to work
with West African, European nations, American
Forces Press Service, Washington DC, 15 October
2007.
102 Press Conference by General William E. Ward,
African Union Building, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
8 November 2007. http://www.AFRICOM.mil/
getArticle.asp?art=1582
103 Statement by Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. Permanent
Representative, in the Open Debate on Strengthening
the Relationship Between the UN and
Regional Organizations, in the Security Council,
April 16, 2008.
104 $50 million in 2007 and nearly $57 million
for 2008.
105 Statement of General William E. Ward, USA,
Commander, United States Africa Command,
before the House Armed Services Committee on
13 March 2008, p 18.
106 Ibid.
107 Mark Bellamy, Kathleen Hicks, and J. Stephen
Morrison, Strengthening AFRICOM’s Case,
March 05, 2008. http://www.csis.org/component/
option,com_csis_progj/task,view/id,1160/
108 The UK, for example, has joined the efforts
of DFID, the FCO and the MOD though the
establishment in 2001 of the Africa Conflict
Prevention Pool (ACPP). The ACPP, supported
by the Treasury and coordinated at Ministerial
level by the Cabinet Office, serves as a tool for
joint analysis, financing and coordination in
areas where collaboration between the three departments
can add value to UK conflict prevention
activities. Objectives and priorities are laid
out in a jointly agreed UK Sub-Saharan Africa
Strategy for Conflict Prevention. The ACPP
budget for FY 2005/6 was £60m, of which
MOD spent around £30m.
109 Senator Russell Feingold, Creation of a U.S.
Africa Command, Congressional Record,
Senate, 10 January 2007, page s352.

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